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I. Introduction
In the American judicial system, there exists a tension "be-
tween the secrecy required to effectuate the [attorney-client]
privilege and the openness demanded by the factfinding pro-
cess"' "[i]nasmuch as '[tlestimonial exclusionary rules and priv-
ileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public ...
has a right to every man's evidence."' 2 While the liberal access
to information provided by the discovery provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure are intended to bring forth the
truth, a skillful or well equipped litigant can use those rules as
1. John Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 446 (1982).
2. See Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & VanDyke v. RTC, 5 F.3d 1508,
1514 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)
(citation omitted)).
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a blunt weapon to bludgeon his opponent into submission, a re-
sult that does anything but serve to expose the truth of a
matter.3
Major corporations,4 like those comprising the tobacco in-
dustry, involved in complex tort or product liability litigations
have tremendous incentive to withhold information; this incen-
tive is directly proportional to the damages available to success-
ful plaintiffs in those actions.5 Typically in such cases, the
defendant is a tobacco company with greater wealth, expertise
and resources than the plaintiffs, who are typically individuals
or, at most, a class of individuals all seeking redress for a simi-
lar wrong.6 The defendant in these cases also has exclusive pos-
session of almost all of the information necessary for the just
adjudication of the claims filed against it, forcing the plaintiff to
rely on the defendant's good-faith compliance with the discovery
rules in order to prove her claims.7
Consequently, over the past twenty years, discovery abuse
has become a standard defense tactic in litigating many of the
most complex tort and product liability cases. In particular, the
tobacco industry has developed several evasion strategies of
choice, including, but not limited to, delay, inundating an oppo-
nent with reams of useless information, use of the court system
to wage a war of motions and protective orders against an ad-
verse party, as well as filing patently false and misleading re-
sponses to discovery requests.8 Every strategy is designed to
force the massive expenditure of frequently scarce plaintiffs re-
sources in order to sort out the data provided or fight for the
enforcement of discovery orders.9 The net result of these strate-
3. See FRANcis H. HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE 65-66 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter HARE]; see also Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects & Reform, 3
REV. LITIG. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Flegal].
4. A short list of the corporations employing these types of abusive strategies
in order to try and make an action "go away" include the Suzuki Motor Company,
the Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Occidental Petroleum, A.H. Robins
Company, Colt Industries, Upjohn Company, as well as the defendants in the as-
bestos litigations of the 1980s. See infra notes 37, 39-40, 45, 50, 60, 65, 257 and
accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 55, 69 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
8. See infra part II.A.
9. Id.
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gies is obstruction of the process of determining the truth of a
matter and prevention of fair and impartial justice.
This Comment will analyze the tobacco companies' use of
the privilege doctrines to avoid litigation over the past thirty
years, specifically focusing on the last fifteen years of litigation
between this industry and its accusers. Part II of this Comment
will discuss the pertinent discovery rules and the manner in
which they are abused. Part III will examine the development,
scope and limitations of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrines, considering with particularity the corporate
context and the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to
these doctrines. Part IV will review the case law of the tobacco
litigation, focusing on the use and abuse of the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine. Part V of this Comment
will analyze the abuse of the privileges by the tobacco industry
lawyers as a means to evade disclosure during discovery. Part
VI will conclude that this type of abuse is prevalent, but very
much at the mercy of the courts.
II. Development of the Discovery Rules
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), as adopted
in 1938,10 included a set of rules governing discovery." These
rules were adopted on the premise that access to information by
both parties in litigation is necessary to "promote the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of [the] action ... 12
FRCP 26(b)(1) defines the permissible scope of discovery,
allowing "discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which
is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action
.".. The courts have given the discovery rules liberal con-
struction.1 4 Under the amended rules, Rule 26(a) mandates cer-
tain automatic disclosures of witnesses and evidence, yet is self
10. FED. R. Civ. P. The discovery rules have subsequently been amended in
1970, 1980, 1983 and again in 1993 shifting the approach from discovery to auto-
matic disclosure.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. The discovery rules include interrogatories 33(c);
requests for production 34(a); and requests for admissions 36(a). Id.
12. Perry v. Creech Coal Co., 55 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (D.C. Ky. 1944).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
14. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947). In giving the federal
discovery rules such broad treatment "either party may compel the other to dis-
gorge whatever facts he has in his possession." Id. at 507. See generally 8
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limiting by deferring to local rules, allowing individual courts to
opt out.' 5 Such mandated voluntary disclosure is limited to doc-
uments "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in
the pleadings," so the defendant's disclosure often results in
production of information already known to the plaintiff' 6 and
the overproduction of irrelevant documents-a strategy re-
ferred to as "dump truck and shuffled deck stonewalling tac-
tics."' 7 Rule 26(b) also authorizes the court to limit discovery
where "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery out-
weigh its likely benefit." 8 Should the court determine that the
information requested is "obtainable from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome or less expensive,"
Rule 26(b)(2) authorizes such limitation by the court.' 9
Rule 37(a)(3) specifically provides that "an evasive or in-
complete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a
failure to disclose, answer or respond." 20 The rules impose an
affirmative duty on the responding attorney to make a "reason-
able inquiry" into whether a disclosure in response to a discov-
ery request is as "complete and correct" as practicable. 21 The
courts have required corporate parties to conduct rather exten-
sive research 22 to produce relevant materials in their "posses-
sion, custody or control."23 Such control does not require legal
ownership of the materials, only a legal right to information or
regular access in one's usual course of business.24 Production
CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 2001, 2007, 2008 (1994) [hereinafter WRIGHT].
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(4) (1993).
16. Id. See also HARE, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting 1993 Amendments, FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(a)).
17. See infra text accompanying note 42.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1993).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3).
21. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g). A litigant or his attorney is required to sign discov-
ery responses, certifying that he or she has read the response and after a reason-
able inquiry believes all available information was provided. Id.
22. See Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73 (D. Mass. 1976); Mor-
gan Smith Automotive Prods., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 54 F.R.D. 19 (E.D. Pa.
1971). See also HARE, supra note 3, at 30-31 (where parties are required to inquire
of employees, present and former, for information).
23. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a).
24. See infra part III.C. See also HARE, supra note 3, at 38-40. Parties have
been held to have such "control" over documents where they were given to attor-
neys or maintained by employed experts on investigations. Id. at 31.
19961 529
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may be compelled where the documents are located at other
branches or remote subsidiaries of a corporation, even if the
documents reside outside of the court's jurisdiction. 25
If the party should learn that in some material respect the
information disclosed is incomplete or incorrect, Rule 26(e) im-
poses a continuing duty on a party to supplement its discovery
responses in order to prevent a knowing concealment.26 Fur-
ther, Rule 37(c)(1) imposes a sanction upon any party who fails
to disclose the information required by Rules 26(a) or 26(e), by
prohibiting the use of that information at trial.2 7
In the face of any attempts to limit the scope of discovery,
there remains a presumption in favor of allowing discovery, but
limits do exist.2 8 Rule 26(b)(1) specifically excludes privileged
matters from discovery, 29 but the party asserting any privilege
from discovery has a heavy burden of proof to describe the na-
ture of the confidential communications in a manner which
demonstrates that the privilege has been properly asserted.30
A. Discovery Abuse
The adoption of and subsequent amendments3 1 to the fed-
eral discovery rules reflect clear policy choices. In theory, they
seek to broaden the allowable scope of discovery, to eliminate
excessive discovery demands utilizing objective limitations, to
control response evasion with mandatory disclosure obligations,
and to prevent frivolous law suits. 3 2 The discovery procedures
have been described as "mak[ing] a trial less a game of
blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues
and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent."33 However,
in recent years there has been a great deal of discovery abuse,
25. HARE, supra note 3, at 31-32. See generally D.E. Ytreberg, Annotation,
Discovery & Inspection: Compelling Party to Disclose Information in Hands of Af-
filiated or Subsidiary Corporation, or Independent Contractor, Not Made Party to
Suit, 19 A.L.R.3D 1134 (1968 & Supp. 1992).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1) (1993). See generally WRIGHT, supra note 14,
§ 2049.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (1993).
28. See Berkley v. Clark Equip. Co., 26 F.R.D. 153, 154 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
31. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
32. HARE, supra note 3, at 65-68.
33. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
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either by overuse and misuse of requests for discovery or by
"stonewalling."34 Under the FRCP, the party resisting disclo-
sure, generally the defendant in the tobacco litigations, may ac-
tually gain even more control over the exchange of information,
whereby plaintiffs, whose proof of a defendant's liability rests in
the hands of the defendants themselves, file insufficiently sup-
ported claims as a result.3 5 At least one commentator has
noted, "lawsuits are often brought on scanty facts for the simple
reason that the facts are in the hands of the adverse party,"
often wealthy and powerful defendants well equipped to stone-
wall the process. 36 Furthermore, most such evasion goes unno-
ticed, compromising the search for the truth. Generally, those
parties seeking discovery are more concerned with evasion and
seek to broaden discovery, while those resisting discovery are
more concerned with misuse of discovery requests and seek to
narrow the scope of discovery.
Such manipulation of the discovery rules has been de-
scribed as one of "the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of
those who abuse the adversarial system for the sole benefit of
their clients."37 Various tactics utilized to stonewall discovery,
such as boilerplate objections unsupported by factual basis or
legal justification, have become commonplace. These tactics
should theoretically result in Rule 37 sanctions.38 While broad
discovery requests are typically challenged by the courts as
vague on one hand, the semantics of specifically worded discov-
ery requests are given an unreasonably narrow interpretation
by the courts to avoid disclosure on the other. 9
34. See generally Flegal, supra note 3. Stonewalling is a method of evasion in
offering complete and timely responses to discovery requests. Id.
35. HARE, supra note 3, at 65-68.
36. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 & Public Interest Litigation, 22
VAL. U. L. REV. 331, 342 (1988).
37. Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993) (quoting Tommy Prud'homme, The Need For Responsi-
bility Within the Adversarial System, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 443, 460 (1990-1991)).
38. See supra part II.A., II.B. See, e.g., Kramer v. Boeing, 126 F.R.D. 690 (D.
Minn. 1989). Examples of "boilerplate" objections include but are not limited to
the following: irrelevancy, overbroadness, and burdensomeness. Id. at 698. See
also Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
39. See, e.g., Emerick v. Fenick Indus., 539 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1976); Sellon v.
Smith, 112 F.R.D. 9, 11 (D. Del. 1986). See generally Walter Kiechel III, The
Strange Case of Kodak's Lawyers, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 188-90 (Eastman Ko-
1996] 531
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Another tactic often used by defendants to restrict discov-
ery is to attempt to artificially limit the scope of relevance of
requested items,40 including the issuance of misleading, incom-
plete or false responses in reply to discovery requests, leading
plaintiffs to believe that further inquiry will be unproductive. 41
Other attempts to suppress meaningful discovery employ the
practice of "dump truck discovery,"4 2 a method of responding to
discovery requests with volumes of uncatalogued and spurious
information. 43 This tactic buries important evidence among a
mass of useless information, and depletes the resources of the
party seeking the discovery in a clerical exercise to "separate
the wheat from the chaff."
Another common form of discovery abuse is the strategy of
delay, which inevitably leads to a "war of attrition,"44 protracted
litigation designed to deplete an opponent's resources.45 The de-
dak's defense counsel drew distinction between "correspondence" and "reports" to
justify its failure to produce relevant information).
40. See, e.g., Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., No. CV 490-322 (S.D. Ga. Dec 30,
1991) (finding evasion of discovery based on a subjective, narrow view of rele-
vance), affd, 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 181 (1993). One
example of limiting the scope of relevance is limiting information to particular
years or models. 987 F.2d at 1540.
41. See, e.g., Babb v. Ford Motor Co., 535 N.E.2d 676, 682-83 (Ohio Ct. App.
1987) (defendant disclosed only a few harmless documents, while claiming it was
complete disclosure); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability, 506 F. Supp. 750, 751
(E.D. N.Y. 1980) (use of record retention system to conceal or destroy pertinent
"damaging" information); Foster v. Gillette Co., 161 Cal. Rptr. 134, 139 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979) (use of product tests after the discovery phase to exclude unfavorable
test results).
42. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., American Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 109
F.R.D. 263, 266 (E.D. N.C. 1985)(court held it was an abuse of the discovery rules
to direct a plaintiff to a warehouse with millions of unsorted documents).
44. Plaintiffs Reply Brief app. A, The Tobacco Companies' War ofAttrition, at
9, Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., et al., (E.D. La. 1994) [hereinafter Cas-
tano Appendix A].
45. See, e.g., Dean v. A.H. Robins Co., 101 F.R.D. 21 (D. Minn. 1984) (A.H.
Robins Company defended the Dalkon Shield, an IUJD contraceptive device, utiliz-
ing lengthy deposition and document discovery delays to wear down its opponents).
See generally Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Dis-
covery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1978). Delay responses to discovery re-
quests include but are not limited to the following: requests for extensions to
respond, denying the existence of documents, filing motions for reconsideration of
orders compelling discovery, requesting protective orders prohibiting opponents
from sharing information with others, and efforts to seek appellate review. See also
HARE, supra note 3, at 94-102.
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fendant's initial withholding of damaging information may also
result in the plaintiff deciding that her best option is to seek an
early settlement. Frequently, this settlement is substantially
leaner than she would have considered if she had received all of
the facts requested, since she is essentially unable to evaluate
the merits of her case. 46 Delay inevitably means increased re-
source demands on the plaintiff, which works to the advantage
of the wealthier parties, which are frequently, if not exclusively,
the tobacco companies in the tobacco litigations.47
One other technique utilized to evade discovery is to falsely
claim that the requested documents are not in the party's pos-
session.48 However, courts have unequivocally held that a party
cannot avoid production of requested materials by subsequently
turning them over to any third party. 49 In recent years there
has been an increase in the frequency of reported destruction
and spoliation of evidence.50 This means avoiding disclosure is
perhaps the most prejudicial to the opposing party and fatal to
the goals of the judicial system by purging inculpatory evidence
and preventing the truth from ever surfacing. A vast number of
corporations, including the tobacco companies, have institution-
alized document retention policies,51 which are used to destroy
incriminating evidence under the guise of the legitimate busi-
ness purpose of saving warehouse space. 52 By destroying inter-
46. HARE, supra note 3, at 96.
47. Id.
48. See Cooper Indus. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (court observed that "[i]f defendant could so easily evade discovery, every
United States company would have a foreign affiliate for storing sensitive
documents.").
49. See, e.g., Biehler v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 333 N.E.2d
716, 721 (111. App. Ct. 1975) (documents transferred to defendant's insurance com-
pany is not permissible procedure).
50. See In re General Motors Corp., No. 94-1011 (4th Cir. Mar. 23, 1994)
(General Motor's lawyers' conduct included the shredding of engineering related
documents). See also Craig v. A. H. Robbins Co., 790 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). See
generally JAMIE S. GORELICK ET AL., DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE (1989 & Supp.
1991).
51. For a discussion of various corporation document retention plans, see gen-
erally Baker, Lecture: The Control of Documents, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 35 (1979);
Fedders & Guttenplan, Document Retention and Destruction: Practical, Legal and
Ethical Considerations, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 5 (1980); Borow & Baskin, THE
INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 209, 212-13 (1980).
52. Dale A. Desterle, A Private Litigant's Remedies for an Opponent's Inappro-
priate Destruction of Relevant Documents, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1185 (1983).
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nal records, the corporations' exposure to litigation is inevitably
reduced.53 A corporation's document retention policy, though
otherwise legitimately carried out, must be suspended once no-
tice is received that the documents may be relevant to
litigation.54
B. Combating Discovery Abuse
One way in which plaintiffs have tried to level the playing
field and better uncover defendants' relevant information is
through the plaintiffs' litigation support group, which is a col-
laboration among plaintiffs with similar discovery goals.55 This
method of exposing evidence is most successful where the de-
fendants are inconsistent in their suppression of materials be-
tween cases.56
Defendants, however, have developed several methods to
counter this information sharing.57 One method is to compel
plaintiffs to identify in advance which of defendant's own
records is required to respond to the discovery requests under
the guise of tailoring their responses narrowly.58 Allowing such
requests both encourages the suppression of information not
previously available to the plaintiff and discourages information
sharing between plaintiffs.59
Another strategy to deprive plaintiffs of the ability to pool
resources is to seek overly restrictive confidentiality orders,60
53. Id. at 1185-86.
54. Id.
55. HARE, supra note 3, at 157. Such collaboration efforts include but are not
limited to joint finding, use of experts, shared research, and pooling common docu-
ments. Id. at 165-66.
56. Id. at 157.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 109.
59. HARE, supra note 3, at 109-16.
60. Id. at 157-80. In Green v. Ford Motor Co., Ford Motor Company moved for
a protective order reasoning that:
The information, if traded with other law firms engaged in similar liti-
gation with Ford, would allow these attorneys to pool their information per-
taining to this corporate giant, more adequately prepare their case for trial,
simplify the discovery process, confirm Ford's candor in responding to dis-
covery requests, and, accordingly, potentially result in verdicts against
Ford Motor Company.
Id. at 158 (quoting Affidavit of Rudolph J. Persico, attached in support of the de-
fendant's Motion for Protective Order, Green v. Ford Motor Co., No. 40-3572 (San
534 [Vol. 16:525
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which prevent a plaintiff from disclosing discovery materials to
other litigants, or to the public.61 The authority to seek such
protective orders is found in Rule 26(c) which protects "trade
secrets or other confidential development or commercial infor-
mation" from disclosure.62 As with trade secrets, the defendant
must meet a heavy burden of proof, however, including a show-
ing that harmful effects would result from any competitive use
of the allegedly privileged materials,63 in order to justify restric-
tions in the use of any document.64 In weighing these compet-
ing factors, the courts have acknowledged the value of plaintiffs'
collaborative efforts to level the playing field, to deter stone-
walling, as well as to promote efficient, accurate and complete
discovery.65 As a result, courts have generally denied requests
for Rule 26(c) protective orders, construing the terms "trade
secrets" and "confidential" narrowly in a liberal construction of
the discovery rules. 6 6
A decision to deny such an order is more common in prod-
ucts liability cases, where the purpose of the protective order is
to protect industry trade secrets, than in commercial litigation,
where the purpose of the order is commonly designed to hamper
the plaintiffs' preparation for trial.67 Matters of general knowl-
edge, those affecting the public health, evidence of poor man-
agement and general allegations injurious to the defendant
corporation's reputation do not rise to the level of trade secret
protection.68
Diego County, Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 1971)). See generally Arthur R. Miller, Con-
fidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REV.
428 (1991).
61. HARE, supra note 3, at 157.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7) (1993).
63. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1012 (1984).
64. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Corp., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212-
13 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974).
65. See, e.g., Baker v. Liggett Group, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 123, 125-29 (D. Mass.
1990); Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982).
66. See Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980);
HARE, supra note 3, at 159.
67. HARE, supra note 3, at 158-59. There exists an ever increasing number of
requests for protective orders in products liability cases. Id.
68. Id. at 172-76 (citing Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 348 n.4 (Tex.
1987). See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir.
1986); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165,
1180 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
1996] 535
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While corporate defendants attempt to dissuade their oppo-
nents from any collaborative efforts, they frequently coordinate
their defenses, jointly developing litigation strategies and shar-
ing information among themselves.69 In complex tort cases, as
in most products liability actions, the defendants' advantage in
expertise, knowledge and resources is further magnified by
their access to collaborative mechanisms. 70
Since detection of such discovery abuse is difficult, success
in detection lies with the profession and the courts. There is a
growing trend towards greater and harsher penalties in re-
sponse to evidence being withheld, lost, destroyed or altered.71
Courts have the authority to limit a party's discovery in re-
sponse to their abuses where the interests of justice require;
such sanctions function to punish, compel discovery or compen-
sate the court or the other litigants. 72
In all, "discovery procedures are meaningless unless a vio-
lation entails a penalty proportionate to the gravity of the viola-
tion." 73 Corporate defendants must be made to know in advance
of litigation that the costs of abuse will be greater than any ben-
efits of stonewalling.74
III. The Privilege Doctrines
Some materials normally discoverable under the FRCP
may be protected by two powerful doctrines: the attorney-client
privilege and the work product doctrine. These doctrines oper-
ate to protect communications between a client and her attor-
ney and to protect the thoughts and strategies of a lawyer in
relation to her representation of a client. These doctrines act to
69. HARE, supra note 3, at 163.
70. Id. at 164.
71. See generally Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Spoliate Evidence in Civil
Litigation: The Need For Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDOzo L. REV. 793 (1991).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26(b)(2) and (c), 37. See generally Arthur R. Miller,
supra note 60, at 450-63; Maurice Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Dis-
covery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480 (1958).
73. HARE, supra note 3, at 211 (quoting J. Dooley in Buehler v. Whelan, 374
N.E.2d. 460, 467 (Ill. 1978). These sanctions when imposed must be consistent and
final. Id. at 209-11. The party challenging the sanction bears a heavy burden of
demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 210.
74. See Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Dis-
covery Sanctions, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1978).
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shield qualifying materials from discovery by an adverse party.
However, they are not without limitations.75
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege
"The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of privileges for
confidential communication known to the common law."7 6
Courts have continually attempted to establish boundaries
within which the privilege should apply, by looking at the pur-
pose and policy of the privilege, and by seeking a balance be-
tween confidentiality and the right to information.77
1. The Development of the Privilege
The origin of the attorney-client privilege can be traced
back to second century Rome, where slaves were prohibited
from disclosing any communications made by any member of
their master's family.78 This policy was based on the premise
that a slave was a member of the master's family, and promot-
ing confidence within the family was of utmost importance.79 In
England, during the reign of Elizabeth I, the privilege was nar-
rowed to protect only communications within the attorney-cli-
ent relationship.80 During this period, the lawyer was the
holder of the privilege; he stood by his "code of honor" and re-
fused to turn "informer" against his client.' In the mid-1700s,
this privilege was transferred from the attorney to the client,
75. See infra parts III.D-E.
76. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); Haines v. Liggett,
975 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1992). For a general discussion of the historical context of
the attorney-client privilege, see generally Geoffrey Hazard, An Historical Perspec-
tive on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
77. See Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control
Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 424-27 (1970).
78. See Marshall Williams, The Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privi-
lege in View of Reason and Experience, 25 How. L. J. 425, 426 (1982) [hereinafter
Williams]. There existed slave-servants in almost every aspect of Roman life, in-
cluding slave-attorneys. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Alvin K. Hellerstein, A Comprehensive Survey of the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege and the Work Product Doctrine, at 579 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 498, 1994) [hereinafter Hellerstein]. See also J. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton ed. 1961). At such time the legal profession was
based on this "code of honor," where the attorney had a duty to protect the confi-
dences of the client. Id.
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"when the desire for truth overcame the wish to protect the
honor of witnesses." 82 As business dealings grew more complex
and the assistance of an attorney in a person's business affairs
became necessary, it became imperative to the business econ-
omy that clients have complete assurance that their affairs
would remain confidential and that their attorneys would not be
able to disclose such matters at their option.83 However, where
the purpose of the client's communication with the attorney was
to seek assistance in committing an illegal act, an attorney-cli-
ent relationship was held not to exist because such service was
prohibited.84 By the close of the eighteenth century, the tradi-
tional emphasis on the oath and honor of a lawyer was aban-
doned, replaced by a promotion of confidentiality in order to
facilitate the free exchange of information between the client
and the counselor.85
American society was greatly influenced by the English
scope and application of the privilege, and although its ration-
ale has changed, the privilege remains in force. 6 The concept of
encouraging a client to fully and accurately disclose information
to her attorney remains a necessary foundation to our adver-
sarial system.87
2. The Scope of the Privilege
In the early American cases, the scope of the privilege was
extended to provide almost complete protection to all communi-
cations made within the course of attorney employment.88
Many began to feel that the broad scope of the privilege was at
odds with "the fundamental principle that the public . .. has a
82. Id. (quoting In re Colt, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)).
83. See Williams, supra note 78, at 429 (citing Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How.
St. Tr. 1139 (Ex. 1743)).
84. Williams, supra note 78, at 427-28.
85. See Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L.
REV. 279, 291-92 (1963).
86. See, e.g., Dixon v. Parmalee, 2 Vt. 185, 189 (1829) (Judge Paddock recog-
nized the English limitation that the privilege belongs to the client, not the
attorney).
87. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); United States v.
Grand Jury Investigation, 401 F. Supp. 361, 369-70 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
88. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1880); Root v. Wright, 84 N.Y.
72 (1881).
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right to every man's evidence."9 While the privilege promotes
the public interest of allowing a client to freely consult with an
attorney without fear of disclosure, its broad application is quite
inconsistent with the general duty to disclose.90
At the turn of the century, Wigmore set out the elements of
the privilege in an attempt to construe the privilege more nar-
rowly, stating that the attorney-client privilege applies only to
confidential communication where:
(1) legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser [sic] in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relat-
ing to that purpose (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are
at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by him-
self or by the legal adviser [sic] (8) except the protection be
waived.91
A communication is immune from discovery once it is
deemed to be privileged; 92 the privilege protects the process of
communicating confidential information and not the factual
content of the communication itself.93 Materials that may be
within the scope of the privilege include oral statements, writ-
ten documents and tangible objects.94
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege
is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the com-
munication was made (a) is a member of the bar a court, or his
subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is act-
ing as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which
the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the
presense of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily
either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding and not (d) for the purpose of committing
89. Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke v. RTC, 5 F.3d 1508, 1514
(D. C. Cir. 1993) (quoting University of Pa. v. EEOC 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (cita-
tion omitted)).
90. Robert J. Franco et al., The Inadvertent Waiver of Privilege, 26 TORT &
INS. L. J. 637, 638 (1991).
91. WIGMORE, supra note 81, at 554. See also U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950).
92. PREVENTIVE LAw PRACTICE: RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDELINES, PRESERV-
ING PRIVILEGE AND CONFIDENTIALITY: THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE
WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE, A.B.A. 1 (1994) [hereinafter PREVENTIVE LAW].
93. HARE, supra note 3, at 14.
94. Haines, 975 F.2d at 90.
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a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b)
not waived by the client.9 5
No actual representation need be undertaken for the privilege
to operate to protect communications between qualifying
parties.
B. The Work Product Doctrine
While the attorney-client privilege is limited to the confi-
dential communications between a client and her attorney, the
work product doctrine affords special protection to a lawyer's
research, analysis and mental impressions assembled in antici-
pation of trial, as in her "work product," and encompasses any
document prepared in anticipation of litigation.96 Originally es-
tablished in Hickman v. Taylor,9 7 the doctrine arose out of a
need to furnish the attorney with a "zone of privacy" within
which to think about, analyze and prepare a case.98 Rule 26
(b)(3)99 codifies the work product doctrine, and, in effect, a zone
of privacy is created "free from unnecessary intrusion by oppos-
ing parties and their counsel."10 0
For the doctrine to apply, the material at issue must be (i) a
document or tangible item otherwise discoverable,' 0 ' (ii) which
was prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial,102 (iii) by
95. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 2017 (quoting United States v. United States
Shoe Machinery Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1950). See infra, part
III.D.
96. Harvey L. Pitt et al., Corporate Confidentiality and the Development of the
Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. 506, 1985).
97. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
98. Id. at 510; Alvin K Hellerstein et al., A Comprehensive Survey of the At-
torney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, (837 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 59 (1993)
(quoting James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 142-43 (D. Del. 1982)).
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) (1993).
100. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510.
101. The protection has generally been held to apply only to written docu-
ments and tangible things, not oral communications. PREVENTWE LAW, supra note
92, at 1.
102. Protection applies to materials assembled and brought into being in an-
ticipation of litigation, not "assembled in the ordinary course of business or pursu-
ant to public request unrelated to litigation." ADV. COMM. NOTES TO FED. R. Civ. P.
26, at 712, (1970) [hereinafter ADV. COMM. NOTES]. The litigation need not be im-
minent, provided the materials are intended to aid possible future litigation.
United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
862 (1981). However, in preparing for litigation the work product doctrine only
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or for a party or the party's representative.1 0 3 Where an attor-
ney has selected relevant, otherwise non-privileged materials in
anticipation of trial, such documents by their mere selection
may reveal the attorney's strategy and therefore are protected
from discovery. 104
Attorney work product has been divided into two catego-
ries, ordinary work product and opinion work product, consist-
ing of mental impressions, conclusions, theories or opinions of
the attorney.10 5 An attorney's selection and assemblage of in-
formation is protected as opinion work product.1 06
Ordinary work product is discoverable where the party
seeking discovery proves a "substantial need" for the materials
in their own trial preparation, as well as a showing that the
production of the requested materials by any other means
would create "undue hardship."1 0 7 On the other hand, opinion
work product is rarely discoverable, even by a showing of "sub-
stantial need" or "undue hardship." 0
Beyond considering whether a statement is protected as
opinion work product, the determining factor concerning the
discoverability of work product material is whether it was pre-
pared in the ordinary course of business, in which case it is dis-
coverable as ordinary business records, or in anticipation of
litigation, in which case it is protected by the work product doc-
protects those documents involving legal skill, not those prepared by a layman.
Bloss v. Ford Motor Co., 126 A.D.2d 804, 805, 510 N.Y.S.2d 304, 305 (3d Dep't
1987).
103. The protection includes, but is not limited to, an attorney and is there-
fore much broader than the attorney-client privilege. PREVENTIVE LAW, supra note
92, at 1. Courts have held the work product doctrine to apply to paralegals also.
See, e.g., Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037, 1044 (W.D. Mo.
1984); In re Grand Subpoena Duces Tecum 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). See generally WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 2024.
104. See Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1328 (8th Cir.
1986); Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 315 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903
(1985).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
106. See Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1329 (8th Cir.
1986); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613, 616 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 2025, at 374.
108. WRIGHT, supra note 14, § 2026, at 398-400. See Shelton, 805 F.2d at
1323; LaRocca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278, 282 (W.D. Pa.
1969). See infra part III.D.
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trine. 09 The production records maintained by corporations are
normally kept in the ordinary course of business, and are there-
fore generally discoverable as business records." 0 Such busi-
ness records do not acquire work product immunity simply
because an attorney has assisted in their organization or prepa-
ration, or because they have been collected in anticipation of lit-
igation.111 Even when a court finds that the materials were
prepared solely in anticipation of litigation, it may find that the
plaintiff has a "substantial need" for the documents, or would
endure such "undue hardship" in trying to acquire them from
some other source that the court will order disclosure.112
C. The Privilege Doctrines in the Corporate Context
The attorney-client privilege has existed for individuals for
centuries, but it was not applied to corporations until the early
twentieth century"13 because of the complex federal laws to
which corporations were subject.1 14 It is still applied to corpora-
tions only on a case-by-case basis, and is prohibited where the
corporation "funneled its papers and documents into the hands
of its lawyers for custodial purposes and thereby [to] avoid dis-
109. ADV. COMM. NOTES, supra note 102, at 712. See, e.g., Blough v. Food
Lion, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 622, 624 (E.D. Va. 1992) (defendant's accident report was
discoverable as it was prepared in the ordinary course of business).
110. See, e.g., Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D. 292, 301-03 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
111. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (Plaintiff transferred finan-
cial and accountants' records to his lawyer to obtain legal advice and the Internal
Revenue Service attempted to summon the material from plaintiffs lawyer. The
court held that "pre-existing documents which could have been obtained by court
process from the client when he was in possession may also be obtained from the
attorney by similar process following transfer by the client in order to obtain more
informed legal advice."). Id. at 403-04. See also Hoffman v. United Telecommuni-
cations Inc., 117 F.R.D. 436, 438-39 (D. Kan. 1987).
112. See, e.g., Lee v. Honda Motor Co., CA No. 9103-01752 (Multnomah
County, Or. Cir. Ct. Feb. 4, 1992) (court ordered defendant to produce a complete
index of materials in their central warehouse, even where the index was prepared
for trial due to the pressing need for an accurate index and the inability to obtain
the information by other means).
113. United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915) (applying
attorney-client privilege to a corporation for the first time).
114. See Williams, supra note 78, at 425 (citing Brodsky, The Zone of Dark-
ness: Special Counsel Investigations and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 SEC. REG.
L. J. 123 (1980)). For discussion on the application of the attorney-client privilege
to a corporation, see generally Attorney-Client Privilege in Corporate Setting: A
Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. REV. 360 (1970).
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closure. . . . [or] [w]hen the client seeks business or personal
advice, as opposed to legal assistance.""t
The United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n116 de-
scribed the privilege as "purely personal in nature," whereby
the element of confidentiality and the "zone of silence" could not
be maintained if the privilege extended to every document and
person in a major corporation.117 On appeal, this decision was
reversed, with the court holding that the privilege does apply to
corporations." 8 The majority of courts took for granted that a
corporation needs legal advice in order to conduct its affairs,
thereby limiting the privilege only to those corporate employees
in a "control group," who were actively involved in the decision
making process. 119 Limiting the privilege to only those employ-
ees in positions of control prevents witness employees or third
parties from supplying information to the corporate attorney.1 20
However, this "control group" test failed to acknowledge the
vast amounts of information generated at the lower levels of the
corporation.121 To deny protection of such information would al-
low for "unnecessary fishing expeditions and even unwarranted
litigation in some cases."1 2 2
In response to this contradictory outcome, the court in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker 23 expanded the scope
of the privilege to cover almost any corporate employee whose
communication was made at the direction of his "superiors" and
is the subject of the legal advice sought.124 This test not only
encourages complete and accurate communication between at-
115. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir.
1963). See infra part III.C.2.
116. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
117. Id. at 773-74.
118. Radiant Burners Inc., 320 F.2d at 324.
119. See, e.g., Nalta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968); Philadel-
phia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485-86 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
120. Philadelphia, 210 F. Supp. at 485.
121. Williams, supra note 78, at 440-41.
122. Id. at 440.
123. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd per curium, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
124. Id. at 490-92. The test is referred to as the "subject matter test," and is
recognized as a corollary to the "control group test." Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milli-
ken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1165 (citing Harper and Roe Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 491-92 (7th Cir. 1970)).
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torney and client, it also broadens the "zone of silence," provid-
ing significantly more protection to the corporate client.
With the growing complexity of the corporate structure, it
became increasingly difficult to define the "control group" or the
"superiors," and it became impractical for a corporation to limit
its communication with counsel to those defined employees. 12 5
The Supreme Court in Upjohn v. United States 26 rejected this
"control group" standard and other testsl2 7 then in force as nar-
row and unpredictable in extending the privilege to communica-
tions with an attorney by lower level employees within the
scope of the employee's corporate duties. 1 2 8 After looking at the
purpose and policy of the privilege and embracing the common
law definition of the privilege as established by Wigmore,1 2 9 the
court held that the control group test "frustrates the very pur-
pose of the privilege by discouraging the communication of rele-
vant information by employees of the client to attorneys seeking
to render legal advice to the client corporation."13 0 In response
to the lower court's concern about the broad "zone of silence,"
the United States Supreme Court stated that the privilege ap-
plied only to the communication itself, not to the facts within a
communication, which remained subject to discovery.131 In-
house investigations are common within corporations in an ef-
fort to comply with these laws; depending on the scope of the
privilege as applied, these investigations would either be dis-
couraged, subjecting the corporations to mandatory disclosure
or encouraged to a point which would "render it extremely diffi-
cult to obtain evidence of a corporation engaging in questiona-
ble, if not illegal, conduct."132
125. Williams, supra note 78, at 440-41.
126. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). For a thorough discussion of Upjohn, see John Sex-
ton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 443 (1982).
127. For discussions of other tests leading up to Upjohn, see generally Wil-
liams, supra note 78, at 441-50.
128. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-93.
129. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
130. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392. In support of this conclusion, see also Trammel
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1979) (court stated that Congress manifests an
affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege, encouraging the application
of "reason and experience" on a case-by-case basis).
131. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392-93.
132. Williams, supra note 78, at 395.
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1. The Scope of the Corporate Privilege
Although Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Upjohn
clearly rejected earlier tests to determine the scope of the attor-
ney-client privilege, Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence,
claimed that Justice Rehnquist failed to establish a rule to be
employed in future similar cases.133 Commentators found in-
stead that Upjohn adopted a broad standard protecting the
communications of all corporate employees,134 provided that the
attorneys communicate directly with only the employees pos-
sessing the necessary information, such employees are suffi-
ciently aware of the purpose of that communication, and the
protection is limited to the communication itself, not facts.135 A
year later, in United States v. King,136 the court found that
Upjohn provided authority to extend the attorney-client privi-
lege to former employees of the corporation, where those em-
ployees may possess information needed by an attorney for her
adequate representation of the corporate client.'37
The privilege established in Upjohn extends to either in-
house or retained counsel, 38 and most courts have interpreted
the privilege to extend to communications with a sister corpora-
tion.13 9 Where the communications between separate corpora-
tions are "part of an ongoing and joint effort to set up a common
defense strategy," courts may find a joint defense privilege.1 40
Courts have held research studies and tests discoverable
where the subject matter of the study was relevant to the con-
troversy.1 41 Furthermore, courts have held that a defendant
133. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
134. See also PREVENTIVE LAW, supra note 92, at 4; Sexton, supra note 126, at
472-73.
135. Williams, supra note 78, at 462-64.
136. 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
137. Id. at 258-59; see also Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States District Court,
881 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1989).
138. See, e.g., Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 73 N.Y.2d
588, 540 N.E.2d 703 (1989).
139. See, e.g., Roberts v. Carrier Corp., 107 F.R.D. 678, 688 (N.D. Ind. 1985);
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
See generally PREVENTIVE LAw, supra note 92.
140. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 787 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 946 (1985).
141. See, e.g., Snowden v. Connaught Lab, Inc., 137 F.R.D. 336, 345-46 (D.
Kan. 1991) (where research before and after sale of a product was discoverable to
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manufacturer's research and development data is
discoverable.142
2. Legal Advice v. Business Advice
Where communications are made from attorney to client,
and not vice versa, there is greater controversy. The majority of
courts have found that legal advice is privileged,1 4 3 while a mi-
nority of courts have taken a much narrower view, finding that
only those legal communications which reveal a client's actual
disclosure are privileged. 144 There is no consensus among
courts where an attorney receives information from a client re-
questing both legal and business advice.1 4 5 At least one court
has held that this determination hinges on the critical factor of
whether the privileged information can be distilled from the
nonprivileged facts. 1 46
Recognizing the inconsistency of courts' efforts to frame a
definite test for distinguishing legal from nonlegal advice, Wig-
more proposed that:
"[w]here the general purpose of the communication concerns legal
rights and obligations, a particular incidental transaction would
receive protection, though in itself it were merely commercial in
nature as where the financial condition of a shareholder is dis-
cussed in the course of a proceeding to enforce a claim against a
corporation."1 47
determine if the manufacturer could have made a safer product); Accord Fibron
Products, Inc. v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 26 Misc. 2d 799, 206 N.Y.S.2d 659 (Sup. Ct.
1960); Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477, 480 (W.D. Mo. 1950).
142. See, e.g., Hess v. Pittsburgh Shell Foundry & Mach. Co., 49 F.R.D. 271
(W.D. Pa. 1970) (inter-company correspondence relating to the feasibility of alter-
native designs of grinding wheels was discoverable).
143. United States v. Amerada Hess Corp., 619 F.2d 980, 986 (3rd Cir. 1980).
144. In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977).
145. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359
(D. Mass. 1950) (privilege not lost where mixed questions of law and business).
But see United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (privilege is
lost even to legal advice where mixed legal and business considerations in the
same communication).
146. See Redvanley v. Wynex Corp., No. 92 Civ. 2325, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14550 *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
147. United States v. Woodruff, 383 F. Supp. 696, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (quoting
WIGMORE, supra note 81, § 2296).
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D. Waiver of the Privilege
Preserving confidentiality on the part of the client is critical
to the maintenance of both the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine. Indeed, one court held that "if a client
wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the confidential-
ity of attorney-client communications like jewels - - if not crown
jewels." 148 This requirement of confidentiality may be compro-
mised either through the client's disclosure of the communica-
tions themselves, or through the disclosure of documents or
counsel statements which reveal the communications.149 How-
ever, confidentiality is not compromised by an attorney who em-
ploys investigators or experts to assist him in processing and
evaluating information and the communication of only enough
privileged information to those employees to allow them to com-
plete their assigned duties.s0 Note, however, only the commu-
nication between the attorney and client are protected by
attorney-client privilege, unlike these communications con-
ducted with non-lawyers.11 As the attorney-client privilege be-
longs to the client, not the attorney, the client alone may waive
all or part of a privileged communication.1 5 2
A disclosure may be either intentional or unintentional.
While courts have traditionally held that an unintentional dis-
closure of confidential information does result in a waiver of the
privilege,153 the modern trend is against finding that an inad-
vertent waiver of the privilege has occurred.15 4 In determining
148. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also Leathers
v. United States, 250 F.2d 159, 165-66 (9th Cir. 1957); Himmelfarb v. United
States, 175 F.2d 924, 938-39 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
149. In re Sealed Case, at 979.
150. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975); United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
151. United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that con-
versations between his accountant, outside the presence of any attorneys, were not
protected by the attorney-client privilege).
152. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding
that client disclosures constituted a "limited waiver" of the privilege). Compare
United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144-45 (8th Cir. 1972) (disclosure of any sig-
nificant portion of a confidential communication waives the entire privilege).
153. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Okla.
1976); Underwater Storage Inc. v. United States Rubber Company Co., 314 F.
Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970).
154. Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Min. Co.,
133 F.R.D. 171 (D. Kan. 1989) (where precautions were taken but three privileged
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if a waiver has occurred, the court will examine both the intent
and the totality of the disclosure.1 5 For example, the communi-
cation of information to an attorney, where there existed an un-
derstanding that the information would be conveyed to others,
waives the privilege,156 and where a client puts a confidential
communication at issue in litigation, even inadvertently, a
waiver will be implied.15 7 The privilege is also waived where a
disclosure is selectively volunteered to prove or disprove a re-
lated point, 58 or where there is a failure to timely object to the
disclosure of privileged information.159 Once a party abandons
confidentiality by divulging privileged material, the rationale of
the privilege is dissipated and the privilege is waived. 60
The work product doctrine provides qualified protection
against the disclosure of materials prepared by a client or her
attorney in anticipation of litigation. The work product privi-
lege is not lost simply because attorneys may collaborate in
their preparation of materials in preparation for litigation,161
nor is it automatically lost where the information was prepared
documents out of more than 200,000 documents were disclosed, and still did not
constitute a waiver); Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 132
A.D.2d 392, 398 (4th Dep't 1987) (where negligence of counsel sufficed to waive the
privilege); Lois Sports Wear U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the inadvertent disclosure of 22 privileged docu-
ments along with some 16,000 pages of non-privileged information did not waive
the privilege given there lacked the intent to do so).
155. Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
156. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding
that intent to keep the information private was critical to the attorney-client privi-
lege). Cf Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (stating
that waiver need not be intentional).
157. State v. Miller, 600 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979)
(client in a securities fraud case subjected himself to cross examination of other-
wise privileged communication by claiming a good-faith reliance on his lawyer's
advice).
158. In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987) (where court issued a writ of
mandamus and directed the lower court to vacate its discovery order, rejecting a
claim of attorney-client privilege as to extrajudicial disclosures in a book by the
party's own attorney).
159. See Baxter Travenol Labs, Inc. v. Abbott Labs, 117 F.R.D. 119 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
160. Weil v. Investment Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d
18, 23-25 (9th Cir. 1981).
161. United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336-37 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
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for prior litigation.1 62 The work product privilege ends only
when the materials are disclosed to a third party and it becomes
likely 'that an adversary will obtain the privileged informa-
tion."'16 3 Once an adversary actually sees the document, regard-
less of their method of acquisition, the issue of confidentiality
becomes moot and most courts have found that the privilege no
longer exists as to those disclosed documents.164
In the corporate context, in order to maintain the work
product privilege, the corporation claiming the privilege must
demonstrate that the allegedly privileged information was dis-
tributed only to a narrow group of employees strictly on a "need
to know basis"; only employees having direct involvement in the
matters at hand or being in need of the proffered legal advice
may have access to the privilege information.166 Some courts
have held that the fact that the materials are located in the cor-
poration's files does not necessarily render them confidential. 6 6
162. In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977). See generally D. Christopher
Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine & Carry-Over Immunity: An Assess-
ment of Their Justifications, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 675 (1986).
163. Hellerstein, supra note 81, at 16 (quoting Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp.,
No. 85-2925, slip op. at 10 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 1987)); United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d
1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
164. Chubb Integrated Sys., Ltd. v. National Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D.
52, 63 (D.D.C. 1984). See also Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (waiving
the work product privilege where in-house counsel memoranda given to SEC under
a voluntary disclosure program bound corporation to provide SEC access to under-
lying documents).
165. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863
(D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Berkley & Co.), 466 F. Supp. 863,
870 (D. Minn. 1979). But see In re Dayco Corp. Derivative Sec. Litig., 15 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 2100 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 1983) (holding that the distribution of a
press release of the findings of an investigation without the facts which lead to this
conclusion did not waive the privilege; also noting that the substantial need test
was not satisfied to overcome the privilege).
166. See United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D.
Mich. 1954) (holding that once the corporation voluntarily made its files available
for examination, any privilege attached to these particular documents is waived).
But see James Julian, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138, 142 (D. Del. 1982) (hold-
ing that the fact that some unauthorized corporate personnel may purposely or
inadvertently read a privileged document, kept in a file, does not remove confiden-
tiality); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep't of Energy, 617 F.2d 854 (D.C.Cir. 1980)
(circulating training materials - filed and indexed for future use - throughout the
office, renders them unconfidential).
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E. Exceptions to the Privilege Doctrines
Although the privilege afforded to attorney-client communi-
cations and work product has long been recognized by the
courts as central to the functioning of our adversarial system,
these privileges are far from absolute. 167 Courts have required
that the privilege be "strictly construed" since it "impedes the
full and free discovery of the truth and is in derogation of the
public's right to every man's evidence." 68 Courts have also sug-
gested that such doctrines must sometimes yield to strong pub-
lic policy.' 69
1. Abuse of Attorney-Client Relationship Exception
The protections afforded by the aforementioned privilege
doctrines may also be negated by "substantial abuse[ ] of the
attorney-client relationship." 70 Generally, the privilege applies
only to legal advice and attorney-client communications,171 and
courts have refused to extend the privilege to protect a client's
identity or whereabouts,1 72 the amount and source of fees, 73 or
to legal advice which does not reveal a client's confidences.1 74
167. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
168. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing
Weil v. Investment Indicators, Research & Management, 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir.
1981); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867, 94
S.Ct. 64, 38 L.Ed. 2d 86).
169. See, e.g., Matter of Nalkson, 555 A.2d. 1101, 1106 (1989).
170. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 180 (M.D. Fla.
1973).
171. United States v. Grand Jury Investigation, 401 F. Supp. 361 (W.D. Pa.
1975).
172. See In re Matter of D'Alesio, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 2, 1992 at 28 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Westchester County) (court held that a client's identity is not privileged since it is
not relevant to the legal advice provided for which the attorney-client privilege
exists). But also Dean v. Dean, 607 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (court
found the client's contacting the lawyer concerning a robbery indicated a strong
desire to keep his identity confidential); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 408 F. Supp.
1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that location of client was privileged, having been
communicated in the course of receiving advice from attorney).
173. See, e.g., In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 888 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 978 (1975); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Judge Wine), 841 F.2d 230 (8th Cir.
1988).
174. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 520-23 (D. Conn.),
appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that the privilege does not
extend to statements of fact, independently acquired by attorneys); RCA v. Rau-
land Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440, 443-44 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (holding that client waived privi-
lege by disclosing document to third party). But see Rossi v. Blue Cross & Blue
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Also, where the privilege is in direct conflict with the rules of
disclosure of evidence, the privilege gives way. Counsel cannot
unlawfully obstruct another party's access to relevant evidence
or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal information having po-
tential evidentiary values,1'7 nor may she offer false evidence,
regardless of the client's wishes.176
2. Self Defense Exception
The Model Code provides that an attorney may reveal a cli-
ent's confidential information if "necessary ... to defend him-
self . . . against an accusation of wrongful conduct."'77
Although a lawyer may never knowingly assist in a client's
fraud, he may reveal confidential information which he believes
reasonably necessary "to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in
any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the
client."1 78 This self-defense exception is strictly limited to cases
of reasonable necessity, otherwise the willingness of clients to
communicate openly with their counsel would be seriously
undermined.'79
3. Crime-Fraud Exception
As early as 1884, courts held that the attorney-client privi-
lege does not extend to "communications 'made for the purpose
Shield of Greater N.Y., 73 N.Y.2d 588, 542 N.Y.S.2d 508, 540 N.E.2d 703 (1989)
(New York law considers the legal advice which includes information by third par-
ties in its analysis as privileged depending on the circumstances).
175. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (Discussion Draft
1980), [hereinafter MODEL RULES).
176. MODEL RULES, supra note 175, Rule 3.3.
177. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (c)(4) (1983)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE].
178. MODEL RULES, supra note 175, Rule 1.6(b)(2). See also Meyerhofer v.
Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 998 (1974) (holding that attorney had a right to disclose privileged infor-
mation necessary to defend himself against accusation of wrongful conduct).
179. MODEL CODE, supra note 177, DR 4-101 (c)(4); MODEL RULES, supra note
175, Rule 1.6 (b)(2); See also Sullivan v. Chase Investment Services of Boston, Inc.,
434 F. Supp 171, 188-90 (N.D. Cal. 1977). See generally Jennifer Cunningham,
Eliminating "Backdoor" Access To Client Confidences: Restricting the Self-Defense
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 992 (1990).
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of getting advice for the commission of a fraud' or crime."180 The
privilege must give way to the stronger social policy of prohibit-
ing the concealment of wrongdoing, "otherwise instrumentali-
ties and fruits of crime would be beyond the reach of the law by
the mere fact that a defendant turned them over to an attor-
ney."18 ' The purpose of the attorney-client privilege "ceas[es] to
operate at a certain point, namely, where the desired advice re-
fers not to prior wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing."18 2 This
is known as the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege and it applies only to "future or ongoing fraud"; com-
munications remain privileged where they relate to past or com-
pleted crimes or frauds.1 83 It is not necessary that the lawyer be
aware of the client's intention to commit a qualifying crime or
fraud to invoke the exception. 84 Although the exception focuses
180. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989); Haines v. Lig-
gett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d. 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992); In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d
482, 491 (2d Cir. 1982); Regina v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153 (1884) (establishing the
crime-fraud exception). The majority of states have upheld the crime-fraud excep-
tion. See, e.g., State ex rel. Peabody Coal Co. v. Clark, 863 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Mo.
1993); Central Constr. Co. v. Home Indemnity Co., 794 P.2d 595, 597 (Alaska
1990); Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875 (Colo. 1987); People v. Paasche, 525
N.W.2d 914, 917 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994); Geilim v. Superior Court, 285 Cal. Rptr.
601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Bersani v. Bersani, 565 A.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1989); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
181. People v. Investigation into a Certain Weapon, 448 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953
(Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1982). See also David J. Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64
N.C. L. REV. 443, 458-59 (1986).
182. Haines, 975 F.2d at 84 (citing WIGMORE, supra note 81, § 2298 at 573)
(emphasis in original).
183. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Appeal of FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 803
(3d Cir. 1979) (noting the need to be careful to distinguish between past wrong and
continuing wrong). See also Craig v. A.H. Robins Co., 790 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.
1986). But see Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 154-55 (D. Del.
1977) (holding that communications after the fact of a crime are protected, to allow
a defendant her proper right to consultation necessary to establish a legal de-
fense.); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 339 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that where the
party seeking discovery fails to provide any evidence of wrongdoing, the confiden-
tial information is not discoverable).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Soudan, 812 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a party seeking to defeat a claim of privilege using the crime-fraud exception
need not prove the lawyer's wrongfulness in addition to the client's misconduct).
See also United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 540 (9th Cir. 1988). See generally
Fried, supra note 181, at 443.
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primarily on the client's intentions, the qualifying wrong can
sometimes be that of the attorney.185
The crime-fraud exception has been applied to attorney
work product as well as to communications otherwise within
the ambit of the attorney-client privilege.186 However, where
the exception is applied to opinion work product, the attorney's
knowledge of the fraud is required to support the application of
the waiver.' 8 7
4. In Camera Review
To overcome the presumption that a privilege exists, 88
there must be a prima facie showing of evidence sufficient to
"give colour to the [allegation of fraud]." 89 Recent cases have
interpreted this standard to mean that only a "foundation in
fact" sufficient to support the allegation of fraud and that the
otherwise privileged communication was designed to be in fur-
185. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 812-13 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that miscon-
duct by an attorney, as well as misconduct by the client negates the privilege). See
also United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 261-62 (D.C. Cal. 1982).
186. See Andrea L. Borgford, Comment, The Protected Status of Opinion Work
Product, 68 WASH. L. REV. 881 (1993). See, e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d
482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding probable cause to believe omission in business re-
port concealed a criminal scheme of ongoing bribery to justify the disclosure of an
attorney's work product); Bulk Lift Int'l, Inc. v. Flexcon Systems, Inc., 122 F.R.D.
493, 496 (W.D. La. 1988) (holding in patent infringement suit, where attorney
omitted relevant evidence in a patent which was relied on by the PTO sufficient to
support prima facie showing of assistance of counsel in furtherance of fraud); In re
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., "Dalkon Shield" IUD Product Liability Litig., 107 F.R.D. 2
(Kan. Dist. Ct. 1985) (ordering disclosure of some memoranda upon plaintiffs'
showing that the crime-fraud exception applied because defendant employed
assistance of counsel to cover up known defects in product liability action against
manufacturer of intrauterine birth control device); Sealed Case, 676 F.2d at 793,
812-13 (holding substantial possibility that the corporation client's use of its for-
mer general counsel's work product in furtherance of a crime, to bribe an official
and defraud the government, was sufficient to negate the privilege and force the
disclosure of the documents); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 529 F. Supp. 8, 10
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (finding subpoenaed materials, although compiled in previous,
terminated litigation, were made to further criminal activity and therefore not pro-
tected work product).
187. In re National Mortgage Equity Corp, 116 F.R.D. 297 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
188. Fried, supra note 181, at 482.
189. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1933). See also In re Im-
pounded Case, 879 F.2d 1211, 1214 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(FMC), 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979).
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therance of that fraud is necessary. 190 Such a showing is "char-
acterized as an intermediate burden of proof," and is made
necessary because of the difficulty in establishing a prima facie
case of fraud at the discovery stage. 9 1 The crime or fraud need
not be proven, so long as sufficient probable cause is shown to
support a belief that the communications were intended to facil-
itate or conceal criminal activity.192
In making a final determination as to the applicability of
the privilege where there are contested claims of whether it ap-
plies, the trial court may review the allegedly privileged infor-
mation in camera.93 Even where a claim is well substantiated,
the waiver of the privilege is not "self operative" and it is
within the court's discretion whether to disclose a privileged
document.1 94 In camera inspection imposes a lesser burden on
the defendant than a full determination that the exception ap-
plies,195 as it "'is a smaller intrusion upon the confidentiality of
the attorney-client relationship than is public disclosure."" 96
The evidentiary standard necessary to obtain an in camera re-
view may be met by a showing of some factual basis that in
camera review of the materials may reveal evidence sufficient to
establish the applicability of an exception to or waiver of the
privilege.' 9 7
The courts have broadened the crime-fraud exception by
steadily lowering the quantum of evidence necessary for its ap-
plication, allowing the use of the confidential communication it-
self to provide the necessary showing, and by the continuous
190. Caldwell v. Dist. Ct., 644 P.2d 26, 33 (Colo. 1982). See also Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d. Cir. 1992).
191. Fried, supra note 181, at 463-64 (citing Bernard D. Morley, P.C. v. Mac-
Farlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Colo. 1982)).
192. In re Antitrust Grand Jury Advance Publications, Inc. v. United States,
805 F.2d 155, 164-66 (6th Cir. 1986). See also Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Te-
cum, 798 F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1986).
193. United States v. Grand Jury Investigations, 401 F. Supp. 361, 367 (W.D.
Pa. 1975). "A judicial proceeding is said to be heard 'in camera' either when the
hearing is had before the judge in his private chambers or when all spectators are
excluded from the courtroom." BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 760 (6th ed. 1990).
194. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223
(9th Cir. 1983).
195. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 690 (D.N.J. 1992).
196. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (quoting Fried, supra
note 181, at 467).
197. Fried, supra note 181, at 463, 468-70.
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growth of the list of predicate crimes which trigger the excep-
tion. 98 The terms "fraud" or "crime" have been interpreted to
mean tortious as well as criminal activity.s99 Courts have given
the crime-fraud exception broad interpretation such that "[a]cts
constituting fraud are as broad and as varied as the human
mind can invent."200
F. Ethical Obligations of the Attorney
The narrowing of the scope of the attorney-client and work
product privileges by the courts' increased application of waiv-
ers and exceptions is contemporaneous with a reexamination of
the ethical rules of confidentiality. The lawyer has an ethical
obligation to guard the confidences of his client,201 whether the
client is an individual or a corporate entity.202
The ethical entitlement of an attorney to disclose a client's
wrongdoing creates some tension with the duty of confidential-
ity.2 0 3 The commission that drafted the Model Rules inter-
preted Canon 37's obligation to disclose wrongful intentions as
taking precedence over the general duty of confidentiality, ex-
cept when the information is privileged. 204
In 1977, the American Bar Association formed the Commis-
sion on Evaluation of Professional Standards to reexamine and
reform the Canon of Ethics. 205 One result of this reexamination
198. Id. at 469-70.
199. Volcanic Gardens Management v. Poxson, 847 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993). There is a trend toward expanding the reach of the exception by "defining
as 'crime' many sorts of wrongdoing that do not qualify as civil fraud by traditional
standards." Fried, supra note 181, at 445.
200. In re Callan, 300 A.2d 868, 877 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1973), affd per
curiam, 312 A.2d 881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 331
A.2d 612 (N.J. 1975).
201. MODEL RULES, supra note 175, Rule 1.6 (1983) ("A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client consents
after consultation. . . ."); MODEL CODE, supra note 177, DR 4-101 (1980) (a lawyer
is prohibited from revealing "secrets or confidences" of the client).
202. MODEL RULES, supra note 175, Rule 1.13 (1983).
203. MODEL CODE, supra note 177, DR 4-101 (c)(3) (permitting an attorney to
reveal "the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime."). See also, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 37
(1967) (excluding the intention of a client to commit a crime from the confidences
the attorney is bound to respect).
204. See Fried, supra note 181, at 493 n.278-83.
205. Id. at 494.
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of the Canon of Ethics was the replacement of compulsory dis-
closure of client wrongdoing with permissive disclosure, empha-
sizing the prevention of substantial harm over the prevention of
mere misconduct. 206 Once aware of any wrongful intentions,
the attorney has an ethical obligation to exert reasonable efforts
to prevent violations of the law. 20 7
A lawyer may continue in the representation of a client
even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct
contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not know-
ingly assist the client in illegal conduct or take a frivolous legal
position. 208 Where the corporation is the client,209 and the attor-
ney knows an employee of the corporation is engaged in or in-
tends to engage in illegal conduct, Rule 1.13(b) requires the
attorney to "proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best in-
terest of the organization." 210 Where such representation would
require an illegal act or ethical violation on the part of the law-
yer, the ethical rules mandate that the lawyer withdraw. 211
"[T]he recognition of a privilege does not mean it is without
conditions or exceptions." 212 It is the "function of the court" to
mediate between them, assigning, so far as possible, a proper
value to each, and summoning to its aid all the distinctions and
analogies that are the tools of the "judicial process." 213
The ethical obligation of an attorney to reveal false evi-
dence is not in conflict with the attorney-client privilege "for im-
plicit in the promise of confidentiality is its nonapplicability
where the client seeks the unlawful end of corrupting the judi-
206. MODEL RULES, supra note 175, Rule 1.6(b) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
207. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (David Doe), 551 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir.
1977). For a discussion of the attorney's duty to report wrongdoing, see generally
Kramer, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyer's Obligations: A Study in Professional
Irresponsibility, 67 GEo. L. J. 991 (1979).
208. Hellerstein, supra note 81 (citing IV Legal Times of Washington, No. 27,
Dec. 7, 1981, at 25).
209. The corporation and its employees (both current and former) are all rec-
ognized by the courts as "clients" for purposes of the privilege. See supra notes
133-39 and accompanying text.
210. MODEL RULES, supra note 175, Rule 1.13(b).
211. Id. Rule 1.16(a). See also id. Rule 1.2(d) (lawyer not required to engage
or assist client in criminal or fraudulent activities). But see id. Rule 1.2(d), (e)
(encourages the lawyer to properly advise the client of the potential consequences).
212. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
213. Id.
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cial process by false evidence." 2 14 Therefore, the caselaw, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the ethical rules recognize
an attorney's role as advocate as well as his obligation to protect
the fundamental fairness of the judicial system. 215
IV. Tobacco Litigation
For nearly three decades, the tobacco industry, unlike the
asbestos industry,216 has managed to shield itself from law-
suits. 2 1 7 Simultaneously, "neither Congress nor the FDA has
... altered its traditional hands-off approach to regulating to-
bacco" for over thirty years.218 While the FDA regulates food,
drugs and cosmetics, it has failed to identify tobacco products as
drugs.219 As a result, the tobacco industry is the only industry
in the nation allowed to add chemicals to its products without
listing these additives as ingredients or establishing their
safety or efficacy. 220
214. Hellerstein, supra note 81 (quoting ABA opinion 87-353 at 6 (1987)).
215. See People v. Belge, 50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1975),
affd per curiam 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d. 377, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976).
216. See Popescu, Cigarettes & Asbestos: A Tale of Two Industries, Hosp.
PRACT., May 1983, at 250. While tobacco companies have managed to avoid liabil-
ity and cigarette smoking has not been directly linked to certain diseases, the as-
bestos industry has been held completely liable where asbestos has been directly
linked to lung disease. Id. The asbestos companies have used the "empty chair
defense," to mitigate their damages by pointing to an empty chair and claiming the
tobacco companies should also be parties to the action. Id. at 254.
217. Clifford E. Douglas, The Tobacco Industry's Use of Nicotine as a Drug,
A.C.S.H. (May 1994) [hereinafter Douglas]. Two major factors contributed to the
tobacco industry's shield: The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
which by requiring warning labels on cigarette packages and advertisements pro-
vided the industry with the defense of assumption of the risk; and the adoption of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), which by not recognizing to-
bacco as unreasonably dangerous barred state strict liability claims by injured
smokers. Michael J. Hannan III, Note, The Effect of Cipollone: Has the Tobacco
Industry Lost its Impenetrable Shield?, 23 GA. L. REv. 763, 771-72 (1989) [herein-
after Hannan].
218. Douglas, supra note 217, at 4.
219. Id. at 2-3. The two requirements for tobacco to be considered a drug are
evidence of physiological effects of product on the human body and deliberate in-
tent by manufacturers to affect consumers with such product; the second require-
ment is lacking for the FDA. Id.
220. Transcript, ABC's DAY ONE, March 7, 1994, at 1. The list of additives in
cigarettes provided to government officials by law every year "is kept under lock
and key," safe from everyone save the few designated employees in the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services. Id. at 3.
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The tobacco industry has enjoyed a record of success in civil
litigation unique to almost any industry, never paying one cent
in settlements or awards for any injuries claimed by cigarette
smokers in their civil lawsuits.221 Out of three hundred cases
examined since the 1950s, only two cases 2 2 2 against a tobacco
company have ever resulted in a judgment favoring the plain-
tiff.2 23 The tobacco industry has maintained this sterling record
in remaining exempt from civil liability, even though its prod-
ucts allegedly kill 400,000 Americans every year.2 2 4
A. The Tobacco Industry's Defense Strategy
Throughout the examined history of litigation in which the
tobacco industry has been a defendant, the industry has
adopted a no-compromise litigation unique in the annals of tort
litigation.225 This strategy is illustrated in a statement made by
J. Michael Jordan, general counsel for R.J. Reynolds ("RJR"), in
a memo describing the aggressive posture the industry has
taken: "'[T]o paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these
cases was not by spending [RJR]'s money, but by making that
other son of a bitch spend all of his."' 2 2 6 The industry's strategy
was simple: "Never retreat on any position and attack when-
221. See Hannan, supra note 217, at 763; Douglas M. Jacobson, Note, After
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: How Wide Will the Floodgates of Cigarette Litiga-
tion Open?, 38 Am. U. L. REV. 1021, 1023-24 (1989) [hereinafter Jacobson]. The
tobacco companies supplied the government with a list containing approximately
700 ingredients in cigarettes, including 13 banned in food. Steve Weinberg, Hard-
ball Discovery, 81 A.B.A. J. 66, 69 (1995).
222. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988);
Carter v. Brown & Williamson, No. 95-00934 (Circ. Ct., Duval County, Fla. Aug. 9,
1996).
223. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 428 n.31 (D.N.J. 1993).
224. TESTIMONY OF JAMES GLENN, CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL FOR TOBACCO, BEFORE
STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENV'T, 103D CONG., Tobacco Prod-
ucts (Fed. News Serv.) (May 26, 1994) [hereinafter TESTIMONY OF GLENN).
225. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociological History of the Tobacco Litigation, 44
STAN. L. REV. 853, 857 (1992) [hereinafter Rabin]. Generally, most accident and
product liability claims result in settlement, but unlike in the asbestos, Dalkon
Shield and DES cases, the cigarette cases have never been settled. Id.
226. Haines, 814 F. Supp at 421 (quoting Opp. Brief at 8). The statement was
contained in an internal memorandum, dated April 29, 1988 directed to other in-
dustry attorneys. Id.
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ever possible . . . ."227 In 1989, William E. Townsley and Dale K.
Hanks described this litigation strategy as follows:
[The tobacco companies] have done this by resisting all discovery
aimed at them, thus requiring a court hearing and order before
plaintiffs can obtain even the most rudimentary discovery. They
have done it by getting confidentiality orders attached to the dis-
covery materials they finally produce, thus preventing plaintiffs'
counsel from sharing the fruits of discovery and forcing each
plaintiff to reinvent the wheel. They have done it by taking ex-
ceedingly lengthy oral depositions of plaintiffs and by gathering,
through written deposition, every scrap of paper ever generated
about a plaintiff, from cradle to grave. And they have done it by
taking endless depositions of plaintiffs, expert witnesses, and by
naming multiple experts of their own for each specialty, such as
pathology, thereby putting plaintiffs' counsel in the dilemma of
taking numerous expensive depositions or else not knowing what
the witness intends to testify to at trial. And they have done it by
taking dozens and dozens of oral depositions, all across the coun-
try, of trivial fact witnesses, particularly in the final days before
trial.228
The key to this strategy was to remain on the offensive at all
times by denying every claim on the health hazards of smok-
ing2 2 9 and concealing all damaging research results from the
public.230 The tobacco industry's "impenetrable shield" re-
mained strong for several reasons, including a public policy bi-
ased against former and current smokers, the high cost of
cigarette litigation, the inability to find a legal theory that
would hold the cigarette companies liable, and the tenacious de-
fense work by the industry attorneys.231 As the history of the
tobacco litigation demonstrates, this "stone-wall" defense has
been successful over the last forty years.232
227. Mark Curriden, The Heat is On, 80 A.B.A. J. 58, 59 (1994) [hereinafter
Curriden].
228. Plaintiffs Reply Brief app. A, at 1-2, Castano v. The American Tobacco
Co., et al., (E.D. La. 1994) (No. 94-1044) (quoting William E. Townsley et al., The
Trial Court's Responsibility To Make Cigarette Disease Litigation Affordable and
Fair, 25 CAL. W. L. REV. 275, 277 (1989) (emphasis in original).
229. Curriden, supra note 227, at 60.
230. Linda Himelstein et al., Did Big Tobacco's Barrister Set Up a Smokes-
creen?, Bus. WK., Sept. 5, 1994, at 69 [hereinafter Himelstein].
231. Hannan, supra, note 217, at 763; Jacobson, supra note 221, at 1021-23.
232. Castano Appendix A, supra, note 44, at 1. See generally Rabin, supra
note 225, at 857-58.
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B. The Formation of the Council for Tobacco Research
The early 1950s brought news of specific health risks asso-
ciated with smoking, where scientific findings established a per-
suasive link between smoking and lung cancer. 233 These
findings were soon published in widely read magazines, includ-
ing The Reader's Digest.234 In response, on December 15, 1953,
the chief executive officers ("CEO's") of all the leading United
States tobacco companies met along with the industry's primary
public relations firm, Hill & Knowlton ("H&K"), to respond to
these health criticisms." 5 Confidential documents ("H&K docu-
ments"), written by top officials at H&K, subsequently obtained
by the Congressional Subcommittee on Health & the Environ-
ment, describe in detail the campaign undertaken from 1954
through 1956 by the tobacco industry to favorably influence
public opinion. 236 H&K recommended a step-by-step program of
product rehabilitation including the formation of the Tobacco
Industry Research Committee, later to be called the Council for
Tobacco Research ("CTR")2 37 to sponsor and finance research on
smoking and health, and the creation of the Scientific Advisory
Board238 to guide these research objectives. 239 The CTR pub-
lished "A Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers" assuring
smokers that the tobacco industry placed a paramount interest
in consumers' health, and pledged funding and assistance for
233. Included in these findings was the research results of an American Scien-
tist, Dr. Ernest Wynder and a British Scientist, Professor Richard Doll, who estab-
lished that tobacco smoke is carcinogenic. Transcript, PANoRAMA's PACK OF LIES,
Feb. 19, 1993, at 994 [hereinafter PACK OF LIES].
234. Roy Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER'S DIGEST, Dec. 1952, at 7.
235. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND THE ENV'T, 103D CONG.,
THE HILL & KNOWLTON DOCUMENTS: HOW THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY LAUNCHED ITS
DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN, Exhibit 2, at 1 (Comm. Print May 26, 1994) [hereinaf-
ter HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE PRINT]. In attendance were CEO's of R. J. Reynolds,
Philip Morris, U.S. Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson, Benson & Hedges and
American Tobacco Corporation. Id.
236. See Castano Appendix A, supra note 44, at 2-3.
237. By the early 1960's the Tobacco Research Commission divided into the
Tobacco Institute for public relations matters, and the CTR for scientific research.
See supra note 44, Exhibit 17, at 6. TESTIMONY OF GLENN, supra note 224.
238. The Scientific Advisory Board is made up of 15 individuals, five of which
hold Ph.D. or equivalent degrees in the medical sciences. TESTIMONY OF GLENN,
supra note 224.
239. Id.
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research into the health effects of smoking.240 However, the
H&K documents revealed that the formation of this committee
was merely a public relations ploy. 2 4 1 As one member of the Sci-
entific Advisory Board observed "less than one-tenth of the
funds awarded [by CTR] are awarded for the scientific study of
tobacco-related effects." 242
C. The First Wave of Tobacco Litigation
The first wave of litigation against cigarette manufacturers
began in the 1950s and early 1960s in response to the published
findings on the health risks of smoking.243 The tobacco compa-
nies prevailed in these early cases because plaintiffs were un-
able to prove a causative link between smoking and cancer; 244
forseeability, in tort or warranty, was an issue of proof which
240. HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE PRINT, supra note 235, Exhibit 4, at 6.
241. TESTIMONY OF GLENN, supra note 224. A memorandum written by Bert
C. Gross of H&K describes the formation of the committee as sponsoring a "'public
relations campaign which is entirely pro-cigarettes."' Id. Another H&K memo
states that the "organization be created for explicitly public relations, not scientific
purposes," to calm public fears. Id. But see A 1978 interoffice memorandum, writ-
ten by Ernest Pepples, then general counsel at Brown & Williamson, described the
CTR as "a public relations effort" engaging only in research "in a non-directed and
independent fashion as contracted work either in-house or under a B & W contract
which, if it goes wrong can become the smoking pistol in a lawsuit." Id. In re-
sponse to these assertions, Dr. Glenn, then chairman of the CTR, testified under
oath that the CTR has no public relations functions as do other organizations pri-
marily because it is funded by the tobacco industry. Id.
242. TESTIMONY OF GLENN, supra note 224 (quoting PACK OF LIES supra note
238). Dorothea Cohen, a librarian at the CTR for twenty-four years, stated that
"[wihen the Center ... found out that cigarettes were bad and it was better not to
smoke, [CTR did not] publicize that [information in the press and instead organ-
ized to] . . . lobby for cigarettes." Id. A July 1991 article in the American Journal
of Public Health cites that "[m]ost of the CTR-funded grants supported biomedical
research not related to health consequences of smoking [whereby] almost 80 [%] of
the [investigations funded by CTR grants in 1989] indicated that none of their
research, current or past, examined the health effects of smoking . . . ." Id. (quot-
ing AM. J. PuB. HEALTH (July 1991)).
243. See Jacobson, supra note 221, at 1030.
244. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1991), aff'd on reh'g, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966)
(a lung cancer-smoking case brought on theories of negligence and breach of war-
ranty, where the plaintiff dismissed the case after thirteen years of litigation, in-
cluding two trials, two appeals and two petitions for certiorari due to lack of
resources to overcome the "insurmountable" problems of proof). See also Mitchell
v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F. Supp. 406 (M.D. Pa 1960) (where plaintiffs even-
tually dropped their cases after obtaining favorable pretrial rulings).
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plaintiffs were unable to overcome. 245 From the outset, the to-
bacco companies exploited a number of tactical advantages,
such as using their financial resources to employ expert wit-
nesses and endure lengthy litigation, retaining counsel from the
largest and most experienced law firmS 2 4 6 in the nation to out-
man and out-gun the plaintiffs personal injury attorneys, as
well as their possession of all of the research done and data gen-
erated on the health risks of smoking.247 Consequently, only a
handful of these cases made it to trial, and none were successful
in imposing civil liability upon any tobacco industry player.248
D. The Second Wave of Tobacco Litigation
The United States Surgeon General issued the first major
study revealing the dangers of smoking in 1964.249 The follow-
ing year congressional hearings were held which lead to the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,250 requiring
that all cigarette labels, packages, and advertisements carry a
warning to consumers regarding the risks of smoking.251 De-
spite these events and changes in plaintiffs' litigation strategy,
245. See, e.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds, 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam) (affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant
manufacturer due to the plaintiffs failure to prove the foreseeability of the hazards
of smoking). See, e.g. Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963). The Court held that the manufacturer is
"an insurer against foreseeable risks, not against unknowable risks." Id. at 37.
246. One such firm is Shook, Hardy & Bacon, a Kansas City, Missouri law
firm described as the "law firm of choice for many companies plagued by high-
status and often controversial product liability woes." Himelstein, supra note 230,
at 68. While primarily an insurance defense firm, it provided expertise in complex
litigation with the number of scientists and experts it hired from various fields. Id.
Included in their list of clients are Upjohn Company, Merck, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Marion Merrill Dow and Occidental Petroleum, as well as Philip Morris, B&W and
Lorillard. Id.
247. Rabin, supra note 225, at 857-60.
248. Id. at 859. This harsh reality in tobacco litigation is best illustrated in
Thayer v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., No. 5314, slip op. (W.D. Mich. Feb. 20,
1970) (where plaintiffs dropped the case due to its "prohibitive costs," after numer-
ous delays, multiple defense motions and granting the defendant a protective order
which insulated all of the defendant's alleged trade secrets and other confidential
information).
249. TESTIMONY OF GLENN, supra note 224. United States Surgeon General
Luther Terry published his report declaring that smoking is a cause of lung cancer.
Id.
250. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1994).
251. Id.
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the "cigarette liability shield" remained unbroken.252 The feder-
ally required warnings gave rise to the defense of common
knowledge of the hazards of smoking, so that the now allegedly
informed users of tobacco products assumed wholesale responsi-
bility for their tobacco-related illnesses. 253 Similarly, changes
in products liability law providing for strict liability had little
impact on the cigarette manufacturers, since the courts had cat-
egorized cigarettes as "not unreasonably dangerous," as is re-
quired by the law. 2 5 4 The tobacco industry maintained its
winning streak into the 1980s, and "'all those who have at-
tempted to prove the evil effects of tobacco have failed to estab-
lish a valid scientific case . . . .'255
The late 1980s produced a second wave of smoking litiga-
tion,256 just as the asbestos litigation was reaching a climax. 257
This second wave of cases marked a number of changes, includ-
ing the coordination of efforts among plaintiffs and their pooling
of resourceS258 as well as significant changes in products liabil-
ity law. 2 5 9 The early 1980s became an era of strict liability for
defective products, and courts began to apply comparative fault
theory to product defect cases.260
252. Hannan, supra note 217, at 770.
253. See Rabin, supra note 225, at 875.
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402 cmt. n (1965). See generally
Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?, 29
ARIz. L. REV. 195, 204-08 (1987).
255. Emmanuele Nneji, Products Liability: Breaking Through the Cocoon of
the Cigarette Industry, 9 IN Pus. INTEREST 43, 52 (1989) [hereinafter Nnejil (quot-
ing E. NORTHROP, SCIENCE LooKS AT SMOKING 117, 174 (1957)).
256. Rabin, supra note 225, at 864-65.
257. For an analysis of the asbestos litigation through the mid-1980s, see
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS
Toxic TORTS, 20-21 (1985). See also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (holding asbestos
manufacturer to the standard of experts). This case eventually became the corner-
stone of asbestos litigation.
258. See, e.g., Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep.
(BNA) at 227 (Miss. Cir. Ct. Mar. 4, 1988); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 822
F.2d 335 (3rd Cir. 1987) (handled by a team of attorneys who developed an exper-
tise on causal link of smoking and cancer and had similar pending cases). See also
Edell, Cigarette Litigation: The Second Wave, 22 TORT & INS. L.J. 90, 92 (1986)
(noting that groups of law firms often litigate together on plaintiffs behalf).
259. For a general discussion of the developments in product liability law, see
Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 796, 797-811 (1983).
260. Edell, supra note 258, at 92.
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1. Cipollone v. Liggett
The information necessary to establish the hazards of
smoking and the liability of the various cigarette manufacturers
were at issue in the most celebrated of the "second wave" cases,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 26 1 Rose Cipollone, a smoker for
forty years developed lung cancer, necessitating the removal of
her right lung,2 6 2 in a case which attracted national attention
from the media and Congress.263 Mrs. Cipollone and her hus-
band filed a fourteen-count complaint against Liggett Group,
Inc. ("Liggett"), Philip Morris, Inc. ("Philip Morris") and Loril-
lard, the manufacturers of the cigarettes that Rose Cipollone
had smoked. 264 The allegations included theories of strict liabil-
ity, negligence, breach of warranty, intentional tort,265 and con-
spiracy.266 During pretrial litigation, Rose Cipollone died from
261. 683 F. Supp. 1487 (D.N.J. 1988). The Cipollone case was part of a group
of eight to ten smoker-victim cases filed in New Jersey in 1983, including Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., et al., No. 83-2864 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 1992); Dewey v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., et al., No. L-071733-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Dec. 22,
1986); Berko v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., et al., 246 N.J. Super. 348 (App. Div.
1991); Barnes v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., et al., 246 N.J. Super. 348 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991); Smith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., et al., No. L-059921-84
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.); and Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., et al., No. 84-678
(AJL) (D.N.J. Jan. 26 1993). Throughout the ten years of litigation in Cipollone,
there were "over one hundred motions, four interlocutory appeals, one final appeal
and two petitions for certior[ari] filed . . . ." Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F.
Supp. 414, 421 n.15 (D.N.J. 1993).
262. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
263. See Mintz & Gladwell, Legal Battle Between Tobacco Firms, Opponents
Won't End Anytime Soon, WASH. POST, June 15, 1988, at H1, col. 3 (referencing
Cipollone as the most heavily publicized cigarette case). See also DID LIGGETT FAIL
TO SELL A 'SAFER' CIGARETTE & WILL B.A.T. INDUSTRIES THWART THE ANTISMOKING
POLICY OF FARMERS GROUP?: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPOR-
TATION, TOURISM AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY &
COMMERCE, 100th Congress, 2d Session (1988) (following Cipollone, Congressional
hearings were held regarding claims of conspiracy and failure to sell a safer
cigarette).
264. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1489-90.
265. Cippolone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D.N.J. 1986),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 749 U.S.
1043 (1987). Count Six alleged that the defendant intentionally, willfully and
wantonly attempted to neutralize the adverse effects of smoking through their ad-
vertising. Id. at 673.
266. Id. at 673. Count Eight alleged that the cigarette manufacturers were in
possession of medical and scientific data confirming that cigarettes caused health
problems, but conspired to deprive the public of this information. Id.
564
40https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss3/5
PRIVILEGE DOCTRINES
her lung cancer, 267 and her husband, Antonio, continued to
prosecute her claims individually and as executor of his wife's
estate.268
For the first time, a pretrial ruling compelled the tobacco
industry to release thousands of pages of confidential internal
documents 269 sought by the plaintiffs to prove that a conspiracy
existed among the tobacco companies to prevent the release of
damaging information on the health hazards of cigarette smok-
ing. 2 7 0 In another pretrial decision in Cippolone, the defendant
cigarette manufacturers obtained a protective order pursuant to
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to prevent the
release of these documents for use in future litigation against
the tobacco companies. 271 The magistrate to the present litiga-
tion granted the protective order which limited the use of the
documents to the present litigation and prohibited the disclo-
sure of any information to third parties without the defendants'
consent.272 Judge Sarokin of the New Jersey District Court
modified this protective order in part, because of the strong pub-
lic interest in the risks of smoking which outweighed the de-
fendants' interest in confidentiality. 2 7 3 On the defendants'
appeal to the Third Circuit, the court issued a writ of manda-
mus based on the district court's "clear error of law" in applying
an incorrect, overly stringent standard of review in considering
the protective order. 274
On remand, the district court once again found that the to-
bacco companies failed to demonstrate "good cause" for protect-
ing the nonconfidential material from public disclosure. 275 In a
supplemental opinion, the court modified the protective order to
267. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. at 1490.
268. Cipollone, 789 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1043
(1987).
269. See also Laurie P. Cohen, Cracks Seen in Tobacco's Liability Dam, WALL
ST. J., June 15, 1988, at 27, col. 3. See generally Jacobson, supra note 221, at
1023.
270. Cipollone, 649 F. Supp. at 664.
271. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 573, 577 (D.N.J. 1985), rev'd,
785 F.2d 1108 (3d. Cir. 1986).
272. Id. at 577-78.
273. Id. at 576-77.
274. Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1118-20 (holding that Rule 26(c) calls for a good
cause standard, not the more demanding first amendment analysis).
275. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 87 (D.N.J. 1986).
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allow the use of the confidential internal tobacco company docu-
ments in other, related cigarette liability litigation.276 The
plaintiffs presented these documents in an attempt to show that
the companies had prior knowledge of the dangers of cigarettes,
that they had developed prejudicial internal defense strate-
gies,277 and that the tobacco industry had concealed damaging
research results.278 The documents released by the defendants
were primarily internal documents of the Council for Tobacco
Research ("CTR"), 279 and were "filled with disdain for the con-
suming public and its health." 280 During trial, plaintiffs coun-
sel learned that there remained concealed documents relating
to the "Special Projects Division" of the CTR, 28 1 which directly
involved scientific and medical research results on the health
hazards directly linked to smoking.28 2 Despite evidence that the
defendant tobacco companies knew the damaging results of
these scientific studies, 283 these "Special Project Division" docu-
ments were allegedly withheld under the cover of the attorney-
client privilege and the work product doctrine. 284 The issue of
the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to these "Special
276. Cipollone, 822 F.2d 335, 337-38 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1043 (1987). The tobacco companies requested vacation of the district court ruling
and requested the case be reassigned to another "nonbiased" judge, but were de-
nied their requests. Id. at 339-40, 347.
277. Jacobson, supra note 221, at 1055. One such strategy involved the devel-
opment of a public relations research group in order to neutralize information link-
ing smoking to health hazards. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. 1490-91.
278. Cipollone, 683 F. Supp. 1490-91.
279. See supra part IV.B.
280. Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681, 684 (D.N.J. 1992).
281. This division administered tobacco companies' attorneys to special re-
search projects which would potentially be useful in litigation. Haines v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1992). These "special projects" were funded
independently by CTR'S accounting department. Id.
282. Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 688. During Cipollone, Mark Edell learned from
the cross-testimony of Dr. Sheldon Sommer, Scientific Research Director of CTR,
that there existed a type of research proposal "that doesn't fit into the Scientific
Advisory Board's research program." Id.
283. Professor Harris of Harvard Medical School and the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology analyzed thousands of pages of research and medical records
finding an established link between smoking and cancer, which the tobacco indus-
try chose to ignore for years. Hannan, supra note 217, at 786 n.122. The defend-
ant tobacco companies themselves paid Harris $68,000 for twenty-two days of
depositions and research analysis, and were therefore knowledgeable of the re-
sults. Id.
284. Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 684.
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Project Division" documents was neither "pressed nor re-
solved." 2 8 5 Upon the evidence presented, the jury rejected the
conspiracy and misrepresentation claims, finding that Rose Ci-
pollone had assumed the health risks associated with smoking
cigarettes.286
2. Haines v. Liggett
In 1984, in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc. ,287 the plaintiff,
Susan Haines as Administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Peter F. Rossi, filed a wrongful death action against Liggett,
Lorillard, Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
("RJR"), and the Tobacco Institute. 28 8 Plaintiff, the daughter of
the deceased Peter F. Rossi, claimed that he, a smoker for over
forty years, developed lung cancer and died as a proximate re-
sult of smoking defendants' cigarettes. 2 8 9 Plaintiff sued on sev-
eral groundS 290 including the intentional tort of fraud and
conspiracy wherein the defendants allegedly concealed known
information regarding the health hazards of smoking and mis-
informed the public on such risks.291
285. Id.
286. Cipollone, 693 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D.N.J. 1988). However, Mr. Cipollone
was awarded $400,000 in damages for breach of the express warranty that the
cigarettes were safe, collecting the first monetary award ever to be awarded to a
plaintiff in a tobacco case. Id. See also Jacobson, supra note 221, at 1023.
Although the verdict for plaintiff was $400,000 in the Cipollone trial, Mintz &
Gladwell, supra note 263, the plaintiffs' lawyers spent approximately one million
dollars in out-of-pocket expenses and had they filed at their customary rates they
would have charged another two million dollars in legal fees. Rabin, supra note
225 at 867 n.90; see also Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 418
(D.N.J. 1993). The three firms acting as plaintiffs' counsel spent a combined $6.2
million over 10 years of representation. Curriden, supra note 227, at 59. In com-
parison defendants spent $50 million. Castano Appendix A supra note 44, at 8
(citing Andrew Blum, Will Next Round of Smoking Challenges be Worth Pursuing,
NAT'L L. J. June 21, 1988).
287. 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992).
288. Haines, 814 F. Supp. at 417. The suit against the Tobacco Institute was
voluntarily dismissed on Sept. 30, 1992. Id. at 417 n.5.
289. Id.
290. Those grounds included design defect, failure to warn of the health con-
sequences of smoking, breach of express warranty and claims for fraud and con-
spiracy. Id.
291. Id.
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To support the fraud and conspiracy theories, Haines
sought discovery of internal documents of the CTR.2 9 2 Haines
contended that these documents would show that the CTR was
a fraudulent public relations ploy, intended only to neutralize
information regarding the links established between smoking
and disease. 293 Four years later, pursuant to Haines' third dis-
covery request seeking documents related to both the CTR and
its Special Project Division,294 the defendants inundated the
plaintiffs with over 2,000 documents 295 but withheld approxi-
mately 1,500 special project documents allegedly privileged as
attorney-client communications and work product.296 Haines
claimed that these documents were admissible pursuant to the
crime-fraud exception, and the district court assigned a special
master to review the withheld documents in their entirety and
determine whether the exception applied. 297 Pursuant to the
defendants' objection to this assignment, while a special master
reviewed the documents to decide if the privileges applied, a
magistrate considered whether he or a special master should
decide the applicability of the exception. 298
On May 22, 1991, the magistrate made two determinations:
1) that the applicability of the crime-fraud exception was not an
appropriate issue for the special master to decide, and 2) that
regardless of its applicability, in his opinion, there was an insuf-
ficient showing by the plaintiffs to establish the crime-fraud ex-
ception to the attorney-client privilege under Zolin.299 The
following week the special master filed his report recom-
mending that the attorney-client privilege be applied to these
documents.300
292. Haines, 975 F.2d at 85.
293. Id.
294. See supra part IV.D.1. This request for the "special project documents"
was prompted by evidence disclosed in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., a similar
pending tobacco related case. Haines, 975 F.2d at 85.
295. Included in these documents were correspondence, memoranda, research
proposals and research studies. Haines, 975 F.2d at 85.
296. Id. Defense counsel submitted logs identifying those privileged docu-
ments. Id.
297. Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 685. For discussion of the crime-fraud exception,
see supra part III.E.3.
298. Haines, 975 F.2d at 86.
299. Id. at 85-87.
300. Haines, 975 F.2d at 86. A report and recommendation was filed on May
29, 1991 by the special master, asserting the applicability of the attorney-client
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Haines appealed to the district court from the magistrate's
finding and sought to compel discovery of the 1,500 special pro-
ject documents under the crime-fraud exception. 301 On appeal,
Judge Sarokin302 of the district court ordered the defendant-pe-
titioners to produce all the relevant documents from the record
in Cipollone,303 which they did under objection. 304 Sarokin
thereby became the first outsider ever to examine the confiden-
tial internal documents of the tobacco industry.
While tobacco industry lawyers maintained the indepen-
dence of the Special Project Division, the companies, in consul-
tation with their attorneys, selectively channeled and disclosed
proposed research projects to the public based on their potential
value to tobacco defense litigation, creating a protective envel-
ope for damaging information under the guise of the attorney-
client privilege. 305 Judge Sarokin found sufficient evidence to
warrant an in camera review of all the documents, based on the
relationship between the CTR and its Special Project Division
which strongly suggested a public relations ploy to misrepre-
sent the dangers of smoking to the public. 306 Upon this inspec-
tion, Judge Sarokin found that the "defendants specifically
abused the attorney-client privilege in their efforts to effectuate
their alleged fraudulent scheme" to mislead the public as to the
health risks of smoking, and that the "only possible conclusion
is that the crime-fraud exception applies to these documents."307
To support his findings he quoted excerpts from five of the docu-
privilege to all but eight of the 1,500 withheld documents. Id. at 87. The master
observed that subsequent to the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act, the CTR began
independent funding and administering these special projects, consisting of scien-
tific and medical research relevant to anticipated litigation. Id. With the on-
slaught of tobacco litigation, the special master noted that the CTR retained its
own legal department, therefore assuming the documents were generated by attor-
ney-client communications. Id.
301. Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 684.
302. Judge Sarokin also presided over portions of the Cipollone trial. See
supra part IV.D.1.
303. See supra notes 269-73 and accompanying text.
304. Haines, 975 F.2d at 87. Petitioners claimed that this information was
outside the record considered by the magistrate and was therefore irrelevant to
this proceeding. Id.
305. Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 688.
306. Id. But see supra part IV.D.1 (discussing the fact that the crime fraud
exception was neither pressed nor resolved).
307. Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 692.
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ments previously reviewed by the magistrate, asserting that
"the documents speak for themselves in a voice filled with dis-
dain for the consuming public and its health."308
On February 6, 1992 Judge Sarokin issued his opinion309
reversing the magistrate's determination, finding prima facie
evidence that the crime-fraud exception applied to at least five
of the documents,310 and ordering the production of at least the
quoted excerpts from those documents.311 This opinion is espe-
cially noteworthy for its prologue, in which Judge Sarokin de-
scribes the tobacco industry as "the king of concealment and
disinformation." 312
On a petition for a Writ of Mandamus, the Third Circuit
vacated the district court order.313 Finding that the district
court improperly considered evidence not before the magistrate
308. Id. at 697. Document #RC-6033263 et seq., was an October 11, 1966 let-
ter from Shook, Hardy & Bacon, which relayed the progress reports on special
projects from a September 30, 1966 meeting. Id. at 695. Two projects assigned to
the CTR and the Tobacco Institute were the responsibility of investigating the
"specific refutation of misleading statements regarding the cigarette smoking com-
monly appearing in anti-smoking propaganda [and the] collection of 'predictions
which have not come true."' Id.
Documents #RC-6033468 et seq. and Document #1005122, September 18,
1981 were letters from the law firm Webster & Sheffield, which relayed minutes
from a September 10, 1981 general counsel meeting. Id. at 695-96. In distinguish-
ing between the CTR projects and the special projects one attorney stated "[wihen
we started the CTR Special Projects, the idea was that the scientific director of
CTR would review a project. If he liked it, it was a CTR special project. If he did
not like it, then it became a lawyers' special project .. . [in order] to protect it under
the lawyers." Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 696.
Document #01347203 et seq., was a November 6, 1978 memorandum from
Donald Hoel regarding the Tobacco Industry Research Committee Meeting of Octo-
ber 26, 1978, including American Tobacco's view of CTR, that it needed to become
"more politically oriented," and "more tobacco oriented" with "skeptical scientists."
Id.
Document #1003718428 et seq., was a November 17, 1978 memorandum from
R.B. Seligman to the CTR file regarding a meeting, and described the CTR as hav-
ing been created as an "industry 'shield'in 1954" (emphasis in original) against the
"statistical accusations relating smoking to diseases" that year; special projects
were described as "the best way that monies [were] spent and that "CTR has acted
as a 'front:'" (emphasis in original) the value to maintain CTR for "public relations
"purposes" was described as "extremely important ... to show that [the industry
doesn't] agree that the case against smoking is closed." Id.
309. Haines, 140 F.R.D. 681.
310. Id. at 692, 694.
311. Id. at 697.
312. Id. at 683.
313. Haines, 975 F.2d at 93-94.
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in making its determination3 14 and that Judge Sarokin's ap-
pearance of bias necessitated the reassignment of the case to
another judge,3 15 the Third Circuit emphasized the necessity of
ensuring the secrecy of privileged documents, even where the
crime-fraud exception is applicable, "until all avenues of appeal
are exhausted." 316
After Judge Sarokin was disqualified in Haines for the ap-
pearance of bias against the tobacco industry and voluntarily
recused himself in Cipollone, he stated:
The issue presented to me [in Haines] required that I determine
whether there was evidence of fraud and misrepresentation, and I
made that determination and found that there was. It is difficult
for me to understand how a finding based upon the evidence can
have the appearance of partiality merely because it is expressed
in strong terms ... I fear for the independence of the judiciary if a
powerful litigant can cause the removal of a judge for speaking
the truth based upon the evidence, in forceful language that ad-
dresses the precise issues presented for determination. 317
314. Id. at 93. After a thorough discussion of the attorney-client privilege and
crime-fraud exception, Judge Aldisert of the Third Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court overstepped its authority in considering excerpts from the Cipollone
trial records, which were unavailable to the magistrate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A), which governs district court reconsideration of pretrial determina-
tions made by magistrate judges. Id. at 93-98. See also Paul C. Gluckow, Attor-
ney-Client and Work Product Privileges - Crime-Fraud Exception - When Reviewing
Magistrates Conclusions, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 800, 803-04 (1993) [hereinafter
Gluckow].
315. Haines, 975 F.2d at 97-98. The Third Circuit focused at length on the
following prologue from Judge Sarokin's opinion, when determining petitioners'
right to an impartial judge:
In light of the current controversy surrounding breast implants, one won-
ders when all industries will recognize their obligation to voluntarily dis-
close risks from the use of their products. All too often in the choice between
the physical health of consumers and the financial well-being of business,
concealment is chosen over disclosure, sales over safety, and money over
morality. Who are these persons who knowingly and secretly decide to put
the buying public at risk solely for the purpose of making profits and who
believe that illness and death of consumers is an appropriate cost of their
own prosperity!
As the following facts disclose, despite some rising pretenders, the to-
bacco industry may be the king of concealment and disinformation.
Haines, 140 F.R.D. at 683 (emphasis added). See generally Bennett L. Gershman,
Disqualifying Judges for Bias: The Sarokin Case, 208 N.Y. L.J. 57 (1992) at 1.
316. Haines, 975 F.2d at 97.
317. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 466 (D.N.J. 1992).
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E. The Third Wave of Tobacco Litigation
Despite the release of numerous internal tobacco industry
documents for the first time in Cipollone, Philip Morris, Loril-
lard and Liggett managed throughout Cipollone and Haines to
withhold approximately 1,500 special project documents, under
cover of the attorney-client privilege and work product doc-
trine.318 Another tobacco company, Brown & Williamson
("B&W"), has never been compelled to disclose any of its "simi-
lar[ly] sensitive" records in its own history of tobacco litiga-
tion.319 Meanwhile, the contents of B&Ws internal documents
("B&W documents"), including memoranda, reports, studies
and correspondence allegedly relating to the effects of smoking
on health are surfacing in the press,320 in Congress, 321 and on
the television networks; 322 despite this exposure, B&W contin-
ues to fight every discovery request served upon it.323
1. Brown and Williamson Documents
These leaked B&W documents suggest that B&W, as well
as the other tobacco companies, have known for decades about
318. See supra parts IV.D.1-2.
319. Myron Levin, Tobacco Firm Sought to Cull Studies as "Deadwood," L.A.
TIMES, August 2, 1994, at Al, col. 5 [hereinafter Levin].
320. See, e.g., Andrew Wolfson, Tobacco on Trial; Papers May Be Weapon in
Smoker's Suits, THE COURIER-JOURNAL, May 22, 1994, at Al [hereinafter Wolfson];
Claudia MacLachlan, Tobacco Lawyers Go On the Offense: Brown and Williamson
Hires Big Guns as it Battles Congress, Media over Document Disclosures, NAT'L L.
J., May 30, 1994, at A6, col. 2 [hereinafter Claudia A]; Levin, supra note 319, at
Al, col. 5.
321. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND ENvT, NEWLY-RELEASED BROWN AND
WILLIAMSON TOBACCO COMPANY DOCUMENTS, ORIGINALLY SUBMITTED TO THE WAX-
MAN SUBCOMMITTEE, DEMONSTRATE LONG-STANDING KNOWLEDGE OF NICOTINE AD-
DICTION AND EXPERIMENTAL INDUCTION OF LUNG CANCER (Press Release December
3, 1994) [hereinafter "Press Release"].
322. Transcripts, ABC's DAY ONE, February 28, 1994 (Smoke-Screen, Part I),
March 7, 1994 (Smoke-Screen, Part 2), and May 16, 1994 (where Brennan Dawson
of the Tobacco Institute discussed the B&W documents). See also Transcripts,
ABC's FRONTLINE, January 3, 1995 (The Nicotine War); PANORAMA's PACK OF LIES,
supra note 233.
323. Of the fifty liability claims filed against B&W in the 1980s, the L.A.
Times contacted plaintiffs' attorneys in forty-nine cases, whereby "no significant
discovery" was obtained from B&W before the cases were dismissed or abandoned.
Levin, supra note 319.
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the health hazards of smoking.324 These documents may be able
to prove that the tobacco industry had knowledge 325 of the ad-
dictive nature of nicotine326 and that they manipulated the
levels of nicotine in cigarettes in order to create an addiction to
that chemical among users. 327 Beginning in the 1960s, the in-
dustry tried various methods of concealing this damaging infor-
mation, 328 including the handling by and channeling of this
324. Claudia MacLachlan, Tobacco Documents: Plaintiffs See Civil RICO in
Nicotine Suit Papers Show Industry Lawyers May Have Abused Attorney-Client
Privilege, NAT'L L. J., May 23, 1994, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter Claudia B].
325. See, e.g., Wolfson, supra note 320. Addison Yeaman's memorandum
dated July 1963 acknowledged that "[B&W is] . .. in the business of selling nico-
tine, an addictive drug," and suggested that the company disclose the health
hazards to the Surgeon General and engage in research to minimize them. An
internal report dated 1972 by William L. Dunn, Jr., a senior scientist with Philip
Morris indicated that "[tihe physiological effect [of smoking] serves as the primary
incentive; . . . [tihink of the cigarette pack as a storage container for [a] day's sup-
ply of nicotine . .. [think of the cigarette as a dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine
.... [tihink of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of nicotine. . . ." Douglas, supra note
217, at 3 (quoting Cippolone, 649 F. Supp. 644, plaintiffs' exh. p-5171); A 1983
research report from Philip Morris revealed that nicotine was addictive in rats.
Douglas, supra note 217, at 3.
326. See, e.g., TESTIMONY OF GLENN, supra note 224, at 115-16. Testimony of
Dr. Glenn, Chairman of CTR before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environ-
ment indicated that nicotine is not addictive and there is no causal link between
smoking and health illnesses. Testimony of Thomas Sandefur, Jr., Chairman and
CEO of B&W indicated that he believed that nicotine is not addictive. Transcript,
ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT, June 23, 1994 (Justice Department Reviews Tobacco
Company Hearings); Minutes from a 1962 research conference in England, at-
tended by B&W scientists, revealed that James Greene, a BAT research director
suggested to "adopt the attitude that the causal link between smoking and lung
cancer was proven, because then at least we could not be any worse off' while
Anthony D. McCormick, a board member of BAT submitted that such acknowl-
edgement would be "irresponsible." Levin, supra note 319, at 16.
327. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 217. Advertisements in tobacco industry
trade publications by LTR Industries, a subsidiary of Kimberly-Clark Corp., de-
scribed a "reconstitution" process which "enables manufacturers to triple or even
quadruple the nicotine content of reconstituted tobacco, thus substantially increas-
ing the level of nicotine contained in the final manufactured product." Testimony
by R.J. Reynolds attorney stated that 70% of the nicotine in the Premier cigarette
consisted of separately added nicotine extract. Id. at 4. "Project Wheat" of 1975-76
included a B&W questionnaire which indicated smokers' preferences in cigarettes
as a desire for low-tar and "high 'inner need' for [increased levels of nicotine," and
two years later B&W developed the "Barclay" cigarette to satisfy both desires.
Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company Chief Denies Nicotine Scheme in Testimony, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1994, at Al.
328. Scientific research was discouraged. See, e.g., PACK OF LIES, supra note
233 at 7. A memorandum written by Vice President of Research and Development
at Philip Morris listed the subjects to be avoided in the potential joint research
49
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information to attorneys merely to activate the cloak of the at-
torney-client privilege, allowing the documents to remain con-
cealed under the color of the privilege.32
between Philip Morris and Lorillard tobacco companies, including the development
of new carcinogenity testing and the linkage of human disease to smoking. Clau-
dia B, supra note 324, at Al. A November 9, 1979 Memorandum written by Brown
& Williamson attorney J. Kendrick Wells III indicated that B&W had avoided fur-
ther research on nitro-nornicotine, a potent carcinogen found in oral snuff, because
"it is the other side's duty."
Scientific Laboratories were shut down. See, e.g., PACK OF LIEs, supra note
233, at 9. R.J. Reynolds' "mouse house" was shut down and all research was col-
lected by the legal department.
Research studies and results vanished. See, e.g., Memorandum dated January
17, 1985 by J. Kendrick Wells III, of Brown & Williamson describing the removal
of "deadwood files," by identifying these "useless" documents with an "X" to sepa-
rate and ship them potentially overseas. Levin, supra note 319 (part of these dead-
wood documents were the "Janus" studies: biological research which confirmed
that tobacco smoke causes tumors in animals). Id.
Battelle Labs in Geneva, Switzerland was hired by BAT to "investigate
whether or not nicotine acts on brain functions in a way similar to that of the
tranquilizing drugs." Press Release, supra note 322. See Claudia MacLachlan,
Firm Helped Direct Tests on Tobacco, NAT'L L. J., May 16, 1994, at A6 [hereinafter
Claudia C]. A 1984 memorandum written by J. Kendrick Wells III states that
"[d]irect lawyer involvement is needed in all [British American Tobacco] activities
pertaining to smoking and health from conception through every step of the activ-
ity." Id.
329. Industry lawyers were involved with the research. See, e.g., Memoran-
dum dated November 9, 1979, authored by J. Kendrick Wells III, as General Coun-
sel to B&W, which advised the company that "'[i]n order to be covered by the rules
of civil procedure [scientific reports] must be prepared in anticipation of litigation'
... [and that B&W must] establish'appropriate paperwork' with its British parent
[BAT] so that documents 'of a certain nature are prepared for [B&W1 in anticipa-
tion of litigation.'" Claudia C, supra note 328, at Al; Another 1979 memorandum
written by Wells encouraged the company to route all research reports through the
company's legal department. Levin, supra note 319. A 1986 memorandum written
by Wells advising the company to utilize " . . . 'concise reports . . . [since] the brev-
ity of the reports will reduce the potential for receipt by B&W of information useful
to a plaintiff."' Levin, supra note 319, at 17-18. A 1970 letter from David Hardy of
Shook and Hardy to B&W advised that "in [the firm's] opinion the effect of testi-
mony by employees or documentary evidence from the files of either [British Amer-
ican Tobacco] or [Brown and Williamson] which seem to acknowledge or tacitly
admit that cigarettes cause cancer or other disease would likely be fatal to the
defense of either or both companies in a smoking and health case." PACK OF LIES,
supra note 233, at 9; The testimony of Dr. John Slade, a professor at the Robert
Wood Johnson Medical School, recalls a lunch conversation with Dr. Frank Colby,
a former R. J. Reynold's scientist, where Dr. Colby explained that a project dealing
with the effect of cigarette smoke on mice was transferred from the Special Project
Division of the CTR to the CTR itself when the results turned out favorably to the
industry. Id.
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2. The Merrill Williams Litigation
The name of Merrill Williams is repeatedly cited as the
source of the B&W documents.330 Merrill Williams, a former
paralegal at the law firm of Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs ("Wyatt"),
was assigned to work as a document analyst in B&W's ongoing
tobacco product liability litigation between January of 1988 and
July of 1993.3 3 1 As a condition of his employment at Wyatt, Wil-
liams was required to sign a nondisclosure agreement 332 and a
confidentiality form. 33 3 Included in paragraph three of the non-
disclosure agreement is a statement indicating that an "em-
ployee, [upon termination], will not remove any confidential
information, reproductions or personally-made records . .. and
will immediately return any such records already removed." 334
Although Williams was hired and paid by Wyatt, he was physi-
cally located at the offices of B&W for three years.335 Williams,
a smoker of B&W's tobacco products "Kool" and "Richland" for
Lawyers were involved with hiring and firing of scientists and funding their
research. See, e.g., Memoranda dated between February 1978 and April 1984 from
Shook and Hardy to B&W, Lorillard and Philip Morris revealing lawyers involve-
ment with the hiring of scientists and funding of their research projects. Claudia
C, supra note 328, at A6, col. 4; The research results of Dr. Hornburger, which
found that cancer of the larynx could successfully be induced in hamsters using a
smoke inhalation device, were allowed to be published if the word "pseudoepithelia
hyperplasis," the scientific term for cancer, was utilized instead of "cancer." PACK
OF LIEs, supra note 233, at 6-7; The scientist, Dr. Dontenwill, whose funding for a
similar study was canceled as being "unproductive," was paid $50,000 for his si-
lence. Id. at 7. But see Dr. Frank Colby, a former R.J. Reynold's scientist and key
player in the Special Project Division of the CTR who testified to "wearing two hats
... in charge of R&D information... [and] responsive to the legal department." Id.
at 25. See also One scientist requesting a grant of $88,773 to complete her work on
the environmental factors causing death, received approval from Shook and Hardy
directly two months after her inquiry. TESTIMONY OF GLENN, supra note 224, at
120.
330. See, e.g., Claudia B, supra note 324; Philip J. Hilts, The Life of Hiding for
a Tobacco Critic Bound to Silence, N.Y. TIMES, August 8, 1994, at All.
331. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, William's Petition for Relief at 4
(Ky. Ct. App. filed Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Petition for Relief].
332. Id. at 2-3. See also Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, Exhibit F at 1, 1-
2 (Ky. Ct. App. filed Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Non-disclosure Agreement].
333. Petition for Relief, supra note 331 at 7. Wyatt is unable to find the
signed copy of the confidentiality agreement. Id.
334. Non-disclosure Agreement, supra note 332 at 3.
335. Petition for Relief, supra note 331 at 4. Williams worked in the historical
archives at B&W doing document analysis. Id. at 45-46.
51
PACE LAW REVIEW
twenty-nine years stopped smoking "cold turkey"33 6 after seeing
documents relating to the health effects of the use of tobacco
products which "frightened him greatly."337 Williams copied a
number of these documents and then, for reasons that remain
unclear, was terminated on March 13, 1992.338 Thereafter, he
suffered a massive heart attack, allegedly as a result of his ad-
diction to tobacco products as well as the stress suffered from
exposure to the documents relating to the dangers associated
with tobacco use, and underwent quadruple bypass surgery.339
In the Spring of 1993, Williams sought damages for per-
sonal injuries suffered as a result of the actions of both B&W
and its law firm Wyatt in Williams v. Wyatt.34 0 Upon his attor-
ney's advice, Williams turned the copied documents over to that
attorney in a sealed box. The documents were then delivered to
Wyatt accompanied by a letter requesting money damages for
Williams' personal injuries, which was immediately rejected. 341
Williams then prepared a narrative "affidavit in expectation of
death" describing the contents of the copied documents, which
his attorney delivered to Wyatt two months later, accompanied
by a threat to unseal it unless Williams was compensated for
his injuries.342 Several days later, on September 29, 1993, Wy-
att brought suit against Williams in Williams v. Wyatt 3 43 seek-
ing to recover all copies of the narrative, all of the copied
documents taken from B&Ws offices, and a restraining order
forbidding Williams from discussing either the documents or his
former employment at Wyatt with anyone, including his own
attorney. 344 This restraining order was immediately granted, 345
and upon its subsequent appeal, the court of appeals upheld it
"except as it directs petitioner to turn over additional material
336. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, Exhibit H at 10, (Ky. Ct. App. filed
Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Answer and Counterclaim].
337. Id. at 5.
338. Id. at 13-14.
339. Id. at 14. See also Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 5.
340. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 5.
341. Id. at 5-6.
342. Id. at 6 n.3.
343. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 94CA-1903-OA (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1994).
344. Answer and Counterclaim, supra note 336, at 6.
345. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, Exhibit D at 1-2 (Ky. Ct. App. filed
Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Original Restraining Order].
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in his possession." 346 Subsequently, B&W moved to intervene
and has been "jointly pursuing its claims" against Williams
with Wyatt. 347
Williams moved to dissolve the restraining order and re-
quested an in camera review of the documents in order to deter-
mine whether they fit within the crime-fraud exception to
attorney-client privilege. On January 7, 1994, Judge Wine of
the Jefferson County, Kentucky Circuit Court denied Williams'
motion, instead broadening the scope of the injunction by re-
quiring Williams to turn over all copies of "the documents and
the narrative" to Wyatt and B&W.3 4 8 In making this determi-
nation, the court relied in part on the aforementioned nondisclo-
sure and confidentiality agreements.349 The court reasoned that
insufficient evidence was shown to support a reasonable belief
that an in camera review would yield the weight of evidence
necessary to overcome the attorney-client privilege.350 Without
having examined the documents, the court noted that it is "safe
to assume that this information was confidential" or else Wil-
liams would have been able to obtain it from some third party
source. 351
Subsequently, Williams received an investigative demand
from the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of
Justice ("DOJ"), which was conducting its own investigation of
the tobacco industry regarding "alleged conspiracies in restraint
of trade."3 5 2 This request to speak to the government, in con-
junction with his inability to speak to his own attorneys regard-
ing his pending personal injury claims, prompted Williams to
petition the court to reconsider, modify, and clarify the tempo-
rary injunction.353 Later, Williams also sought modification of
the injunction with regard to materials already in the public do-
main in order to permit him access to meaningful assistance of
346. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, Exhibit E at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. filed
Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Revised Order].
347. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 6.
348. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, Exhibit A at 5 (Ky. Ct. App. filed
Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Temporary Restraining Order].
349. See supra notes 331-32 and accompanying text, for reference to these
agreements.
350. Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 348, at 6-8.
351. Id. at 4-5.
352. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 8.
353. Id. at 7.
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counsel.354 These motions were followed by DOJ's motion to in-
tervene, petitioning the court for clarification of the injunction
against Williams in order to allow the United States Attorney's
Office to question Mr. Williams regarding these matters.355
On April 8, 1994, the Jefferson County Circuit Court denied
all requests for modification of the original order by both Wil-
liams and DOJ, expressing fear that "the risk is too great that
confidential and privileged information will be discussed." 6
Petitioner argues, in his petition for relief, that the trial court
stated "to allow Merrill to pursue his claims . . . would enable
him to 'profit' from his unauthorized copying of the documents,
in violation of the attorney-client privilege."357 The petitioner
further argues that the court did not address the reasons for the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege in this instance.358
On May 7, 1994, the New York Times released an article
describing the contents of some of these documents.36 9 In the
succeeding weeks it became apparent that copies of some of
these B&W documents had been made available to Congress,
major newspapers and the television networks, yet neither
counsel for Wyatt and B&W nor William's counsel had ever
seen them, and Williams no longer had copies of the documents
in his possession.360
After public accusations that Williams had leaked the docu-
ments,361 B&W returned to court to request an order to compel
354. Id. at 9-11. The modifications sought the ability to: (1) speak to his attor-
neys; (2) publicly discuss information already in the public domain; (3) postpone
the question of confidentiality until a later date; (4) allow a response to the DOJ
investigative demand; and (5) allow the petitioner's counsel to read the narrative
that "he prepared for them." Id. (emphasis added). See also Answer and Counter-
claim, supra note 336, para. 3.
355. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 11. DOJ's motion was filed on
March 17, 1994. Id.
356. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, Exhibit C at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. filed
Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Brief Opinion and Order].
357. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 12.
358. Id.
359. Philip J. Hilts, Tobacco Company was Silent on Hazards, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1994, at 1.
360. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 13-14. John Ballentine, counsel for
Wyatt; J.F. Demoisey, counsel for Merrill Williams. Id.
361. Greg Otolski, B&WReaffirms its Stance on Smoking Addiction, THE COU.
RIER-JOURNAL, May 8, 1994 (quoting Fitzgerald, on B&W's behalf that "[ilt is our
belief that anybody who knowingly uses stolen information is contributing to an
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the production and investigation of these now public docu-
ments, to depose some of the holders including seven major
news organizations 362 and two members of Congress,363 and to
forbid Williams and his counsel from viewing these docu-
ments.364 The order was granted, and subpoenas were issued to
compel the Congressmen to submit to depositions and produce
documents.36 5 In an effort to quash the subpoenas, the Con-
gressmen removed the matter to the District Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia.366
In the district court in Maddox v. Williams,367 Judge Green
granted the defendants' motion to quash the subpoenas on June
6, 1994,368 and further denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsid-
eration. 369 The court held that even where a legislative commit-
tee acquires information illegally, the Speech & Debate Clause
of the United States Constitution provides protection to the sub-
sequent use of such documents in the course of a legitimate leg-
islative investigation. 3 7 0 On August 15, 1995, this order was
affirmed on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia.371
The district court determined that the documents could
conceivably be viewed as "evidence supporting a 'whistle-
illegal act . . . [iut's disturbing that the media would allow itself to be an
accomplice").
362. These holders include, but are not limited to: The (KY) Courier-Journal;
The National Law Journal; Gannett's USA Today; The New York Times; The
Washington Post; National Public Radio; and CBS News. Andrew Wolfson, Judge
Questions B&W Campaign Over Company Documents, THE COURIER-JOURNAL,
September 15, 1994, at 6B. See also Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 3 n.2.
363. The Congressmen include: Representative Henry Waxman, the Chair-
man of the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment and Representa-
tive Ron Wyden, a member of that subcommittee. Maddox v. Williams, 855 F.
Supp. 406 (D.D.C. Cir. 1994).
364. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, Exhibit J at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. filed
Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Protective Order and Commission]. See also Petition for
Relief, supra note 331, at 14-15.
365. Protective Order and Commission, supra note 364. 855 F. Supp. at 408.
The Congressman were ordered to appear at the offices of King & Spaulding, coun-
sel for B&W. Id.
366. 855 F. Supp. at 408.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 417-18.
370. Id. at 411-13.
371. Brown and Williamson v. Williams et al., No. 94-5171 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15,
1995).
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blower's' claim that the tobacco company concealed from its cus-
tomers and the American public the truth regarding the health
hazards of tobacco products . . . ."372 The court further described
B&W's strategy as one where "those seeking to bury their un-
lawful or potentially unlawful acts ... could achieve that objec-
tive by . . . delay[ing] or confus[ing] any charges of health
hazard, fraud, corruption, overcharge .. . by focusing instead on
inconvenient documentary evidence and labeling it as the prod-
uct of theft, violation of proprietary information, interference
with contracts, and the like."3 7 3 The court raised the inference
that "if the documents at issue did not represent the proverbial
'smoking gun' evidencing the company's allegedly long-held and
long-suppressed knowledge that its product[s] constitutle] a se-
rious health hazard," then why would B&W be spending so
much time, energy and money to conceal them?37 4 In conclu-
sion, the court viewed the subpoenas as "the means by which
the company is seeking to intimidate, and in a sense punish,
both Dr. Williams, the discoverer of evidence . . . and the [Con-
gressmen] who are seeking to investigate [the tobacco
industry]."375
Another motion by Williams to dissolve the temporary in-
junction or modify its terms was denied; however, the judge ad-
mitted that although he may have "blinders" on in this matter,
this kind of "the end justifies the means" sort of conduct could
not be allowed to eviscerate the attorney-client privilege.3 76 On
August 8, 1994, Williams filed a petition for relief with the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals, moving that the trial court be prohib-
ited from enforcing the temporary injunction of January 7, 1994
and from re-issuing any similar restraining order.377 Williams
asserted that the trial court erroneously made three unsubstan-
tiated assumptions including the assumption that Williams had
breached the attorney-client privilege with regard to the docu-
ments in question.378 In opposing this assumption, Williams ar-
372. Maddox, 855 F. Supp. at 415.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 415 n.31.
375. Id. at 415.
376. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, Exhibit P at 1-3 (Ky. Ct. App. filed
Aug. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Trial Court Transcript].
377. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 1-2.
378. Id. at 19-23.
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gued that nothing in the record supported the privilege claims
other than an affidavit by J. Kendrick Wells,3 79 then General
Counsel for B&W, who claimed that all of the documents in
question were "within the ambit of attorney-client privilege and
the work product doctrine."380 Williams refuted the applicabil-
ity of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine to
these B&W documents, because they appear to include "busi-
ness advice" memoranda, as well as being subject to both a
waiver of and the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege.381
Williams provided a thorough legal analysis of the applica-
bility of the attorney-client privilege and work product doc-
trines in the State of Kentucky, and made a case for their
inapplicability to these documents. 382 First, Williams asserted
that the trial court erred by assuming that the documents were
privileged absent the requisite proof.3 83 Second, Williams as-
serted that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to these
"smoking gun" documents due to the crime-fraud exception,
made applicable by Wyatt and B&W's alleged "massive fraud on
the American smoking public,"384 as well as issues of both vol-
untary and involuntary waiver of the attorney-client privilege
379. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 C1-04806, Exhibit G (Ky. Ct. App. filed Aug. 8,
1994) [hereinafter Affidavit of J. Kendrick Wells]. Mr. Wells stated "I recognize
each of these documents as documents which were selected by or under the super-
vision of lawyers as being documents relevant to the pending and threatened liti-
gation for analysis by Wyatt in furtherance of the defense of pending and
threatened liability cases." Id. at 1-2. Furthermore, Mr. Wells asserted his per-
sonal knowledge that these documents have never been produced before in litiga-
tion, or made public in any other way. Id. See also Deposition of J. Kendrick Wells,
No. 93-CI-04806, at 19, 23 (Ky. Ct. App. given Sept. 8, 1994). Testimony indicated
that Wyatt, B&W's law firm, was involved in litigation work as well as business for
B&W. Id.
380. Affidavit of J. Kendrick Wells, supra note 379, at 2.
381. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 22.
382. Id. at 23-54. See, e.g., Futrell v. Shadon, 828 S.W.2d 649 (Ky. 1992)
(holding that "business discussions" with legal associates are not privileged com-
munications); Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky.
1991) (holding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to legal advice
sought in furtherance of a crime). See also Transit Authority of River City v. Vin-
son, 703 S.W.2d 482 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing the qualified immunity of-
fered by the work product doctrine is subject to limitation by a showing of
substantial need and undue hardship).
383. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 21-22, 71.
384. Id. at 72-73. See also Affidavit of J. Kendrick Wells, supra note 379, at
15.
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with respect to these documents.38 5 Finally, Williams requested
relief from the "gag order" which he claimed deprived him of his
right to meaningful assistance of counsel.386 Petitioner Wil-
liams claimed the trial court failed to determine any of these
issues through the appropriate proceedings, instead relying on
"assumptions," giving lip-service to the privilege doctrines and
their limitations.387
On November 8, 1994, Judge Schroder of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals granted William's petition for relief in part,
directing a vacatur of the part of the temporary injunction
which prevented Williams from communicating with his attor-
neys about the case.3 88 The court reasoned that the trial court
had failed to "adjudicate[ ] the application of the attorney-client
privilege to the documents," instead merely assuming that such
privilege exists. 3 8 9
Judge Wine of the circuit court, Wyatt and B&W appealed
to the Kentucky Supreme Court from the court of appeals order
and also filed a motion for a stay of that order pending final
decision of the issue.390 On November 22, 1994, the Kentucky
Supreme Court granted appellant's request for a stay of the or-
der pending final decision on the merits of the appeal.391 The
court acknowledged that no judicial officer determined whether
the attorney-client privilege applied to these documents, but
found a "strong likelihood that some, if not many, are so privi-
leged" 3 9 2 from the limited record on appeal.393
Appellants Wyatt, B&W and Wine requested that the court
of appeals order be reversed, emphasizing the "sacrosanct" na-
ture of the attorney-client privilege, that disclosure to appellee's
counsel must be forbidden, and that any such disclosure re-
385. Petition for Relief, supra note 331, at 72.
386. Id. at 16, 71.
387. Id. at 19-23, 71.
388. Williams v. Wyatt, No. 93 CI-04806, App. B at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. filed Aug.
8, 1994) [hereinafter Denial to Modify].
389. Id. at 3-4.
390. Wyatt v. Merrill Williams, No. 94-SC-935-MR (Ky. Nov. 22, 1994) at 1
[hereinafter Supreme Court Order].
391. Id. at 4.
392. Id. at 3-4.
393. Id. at 3.
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quires disqualification of appellee's counsel.394 Furthermore,
appellants argued that no authority existed to allow appellee
the right to communicate this confidential information to his
counsel, either in furtherance of his own defense or in prosecu-
tion of his claims.395 Appellants Wyatt, B&W and Wine as-
serted that these documents were privileged in the first place,
since Williams was a paralegal hired and trained "as part of the
Brown & Williamson legal team . . . [e]verything he knows
about Brown & Williamson is a product of the attorney-client
relationship between Williams and Brown & Williamson."3 9 6
Appellants further claimed that these documents "selected by
[B&W's] counsel for detailed analysis by lawyers and parale-
gals,"3 97 including Williams, were given subject to a confidenti-
ality agreement,398 and that to allow appellee to communicate to
his counsel what he learns from those documents would essen-
tially "invite opposing counsel" to participate in meetings where
appellant's litigation strategy and application of the documents
to pending litigation were discussed and analyzed.399
In opposition, Williams demanded that the order of the
court of appeals be affirmed, 400 arguing that the existence of an
issue involving the alleged applicability and abuse of the attor-
ney-client privilege and the work product doctrine does not sus-
pend the right to confer with one's own counsel or "obliterate
the integrity of the adversarial process of litigation."401 Wil-
liams argued that although Wyatt argued that the attorney-cli-
ent privilege with respect to these documents is "sacrosanct,"402
the trial court never made a ruling as to "what, if any, of the
394. Brief of Appellants at 16-20, Wyatt v. Merrill Williams, No. 94-SC-935-
MR (Ky. Nov. 22, 1994). See, e.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d
Cir. 1975) (the court held that the disclosure of documents protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege need not be proven, it may be presumed, requiring disqualifica-
tion of counsel); Riggs v. Schroering, 822 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. 1992) (Response Brief of
Appellants at 4, 7-8) (attorney-client privilege is "sacrosanct").
395. Wyatt v. Merrill Williams, No. 94-SC-935-MR (Ky. Nov. 22, 1994).
396. Id. at 7.
397. Brief of Appellants, supra note 394, at 3.
398. Nondisclosure Agreement, supra note 332.
399. Brief of Appellants, supra note 394, at 14.
400. Merrill Williams Brief in Opposition at 48, Wyatt v. Merrill Williams,
No. 94-SC-935-MR (Ky. Nov. 22, 1994).
401. Reply Brief of Appellee, Merrill Williams at 2, Wyatt v. Merrill Williams,
94-SC-935-MR (Ky. Nov. 22, 1994).
402. See supra text accompanying note 394.
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documents . . . actually do fall within the 'attorney-client privi-
lege,' "403 since the court based its decision solely upon the testi-
mony of J. Kendrick Wells. Appellee also claimed that his
inability to receive effective assistance of counsel prevented him
from disputing any assertion of privilege, any claim against
him, or from prosecuting his own personal injury claims. 40 4
On February 16, 1995, the Kentucky Supreme Court re-
versed the order of the court of appeals purely on procedural
grounds, 4 0 5 and therefore did not address the issue of attorney-
client privilege. 406 Meanwhile, the complexion of this case has
changed dramatically. In addition to Williams fleeing the State
of Kentucky in order to avoid the gag order,407 it readily became
apparent that Stanton Glantz, a professor of medicine at the
University of California at San Francisco and an active tobacco
opponent, has been quietly housing a copy of the B&W docu-
ments since May of 1994 when he received them in an anony-
mous Federal Express shipment. 408 Glantz has made these
documents available for public inspection in a special archive at
the university's medical library.409 Subsequently, B&W made
fierce attempts to recover the documents in the possession of
the university, and to seek injunctive relief to prevent public
access to these documents. 4 10 These attempts were brought to a
halt on May 25, 1995, by Judge Stuart A. Pollack who ruled
that the documents may remain accessible to the public.411
Given the nationwide dissemination of the documents, on
April 3, 1995, Judge Wine of the Kentucky Circuit Court found
it necessary to modify the temporary injunction of January 7,
403. Merrill Williams Brief in Opposition at 25 (emphasis in original).
404. Id. at 2-4, 7-10.
405. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the court of appeals improperly
exercised its jurisdiction in modifying an injunction, where Williams precluded
himself from claiming no adequate remedy by appeal after failing to file appeal of
the injunction within the statutory twenty day period. Wyatt v. Williams, 892
S.W. 2d 584, 586 (Ky. 1995).
406. Id.
407. Bill Kisluk, Searching for Mr. Butts; Mystery Tobacco Papers Fuel Litiga-
tion, LEGAL TIMES, May 29, 1995, at 2.
408. Michael Orey, A Mole's Tale, AM. LAw., July-Aug. 1995.
409. Id.
410. Brown and Williamson v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 96-7298 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. May 25, 1995).
411. Id.
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1994 to allow Williams to speak with his legal counsel.412 In
addition, the court rejected Williams' attorney's motion for
Judge Wine to voluntarily remove himself from the case and as-
sign the matter to another judge.413 Instead, Judge Wine as-
signed himself to the job of reviewing the documents in camera
to determine if they are privileged. 414 To date, the issue of privi-
lege is still pending before the circuit court.
3. Butler v. Philip Morris
In Butler v. Philip Morris, Inc.,416 the plaintiffs initially
filed a motion to compel, requesting that the court overrule de-
fendant B&Ws objections and compel B&W to respond more
completely to the plaintiffs initial request for the production of
between one hundred and six hundred B&W documents.416 On
or about August 17, 1994 B&W produced only four of the re-
quested documents 417 and objected to the disclosure of every
other requested document, claiming that the documents were
stolen from Wyatt, the Kentucky law firm representing B&W,
and were subject to the injunction issued by the Circuit Court of
Jefferson County. 418 B&W further objected to the discovery re-
quest on the grounds that the documents were subject to the
412. Maddox v. Williams, No. 93C104806, 1995 WL 569425 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Apr.
3, 1995).
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. No. 94-5-53, slip op. (Miss. filed Jan. 6, 1995). Defendants include: Philip
Morris, Inc., Philip Morris Companies, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
Batus, Inc., BAT Industries PLC, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., RJR Nabisco, Inc.,
Liggett Group, Inc., Liggett & Myers, Inc., The Brooke Group, Limited, American
Brands, Inc., The American Tobacco Co., Loews Corp., Lorillard Corp., The Council
for Tobacco Research-U.S.A. Inc., Tobacco Institute Research Committee, The
Tobacco Institute, Inc., Hill & Knowlton, Inc., and Laurel Cigar & Tobacco Co. Id.
416. Id. See also supra part IV.E.1.
417. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel at 2, Butler v.
Philip Morris, (Miss. filed Jan. 6) (No. 94-5-53) [hereinafter Plaintiffs Memoran-
dum]. The four documents included: A report entitled The Fate of Nicotine in the
Body, dated May, 1963, authored by E. Gessbuhler and C. Haselbach; Final Re-
port on Project HIPPO II, dated January, 1962, authored by J. Hersch, 0. Libert
and C. Ross-Effront; Report No. 1 Regarding Project HIPPO II, dated June, 1962,
authored by 0. Libert of the Battelle Memorial Institute for British American To-
bacco Company, Ltd.; and Final Report on HIPPO II, dated March, 1963, authored
by C. H. Haselbach and 0. Libert. Id.
418. Id. at 3-4. See also supra part IV.E.2.
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attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. 419 Finally,
B&W objected to the production of the documents on grounds
that the request was "overly broad, vague and burdensome." 4 2 0
With regard to the injunction, plaintiff argued that the
Kentucky Circuit Court cannot bind the Circuit Court for the
Second Judicial District of Jones County, Mississippi, and the
injunction was relevant only towards the law clerk who alleg-
edly stole the documents, not to the plaintiffs in this case, who
are third parties to that action.421 Plaintiff additionally as-
serted that the injunction was issued without the court having
examined the documents to determine the applicability of the
attorney-client privilege.422
In his motion to compel,423 the plaintiff offered three argu-
ments refuting B&W's objection that the documents are privi-
leged communications in accordance with the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine. First, by failing to particu-
larize which documents were allegedly privileged and the rea-
sons for their confidentiality, B&W has improperly asserted the
privilege, thereby waiving any future right to do so with regard
to these documents, and since B&W disclosed allegedly privi-
leged research studies, they had waived the privilege as it ap-
plies to all other allegedly privileged documents. 424 Second,
that the requested documents were outside the scope of the type
of information intended to be protected by the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrines, since they "passed
through the hands of an attorney [simply] to create a 'privileged
sanctuary' for corporate records," containing primarily business
rather than legal advice and having been prepared for research
purposes as opposed to litigation preparation.425 The plaintiff
alleged that the selection of these B&W documents was actually
done by Merrill Williams himself, not a lawyer.426 Further-
419. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 417, at 4.
420. Id. at 3.
421. Id. at 4.
422. Id. at 14.
423. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, Butler v. Phillip Morris (Miss. filed Sept.
28, 1994) (No. 94-5-53) [hereinafter "Plaintiffs Motion to Compel"].
424. Id. at 4-6. The research studies consisted of four documents already re-
leased by Brown & Williamson. Transcript, ABC's DAY ONE, May 16, 1994.
425. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, supra note 423, at 7.
426. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 417, at 22.
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more, plaintiff claimed that if the documents were legitimate
attorney work product, their immunity was overcome by plain-
tiffs substantial need for the information and the inability to
acquire this information by other means without undue hard-
ship.427 Finally, the plaintiff characterized these documents as
materials "reasonably calculated to lead to evidence of fraud
and conspiracy." 428 The communications involved the assist-
ance of counsel only to further the company's fraud upon the
court as well as their continuing fraud and deceit on the Ameri-
can public, and therefore fall into4 2 9 the crime-fraud exception
to any privilege that might otherwise apply, pursuant to the
Mississippi Rules of Evidence. 430
Finally, the plaintiff argued that the requested documents
had been subject to wide public distribution, and discounted the
defendant's last objection that the discovery requests were
"overly broad and burdensome." 4 3 1 The plaintiff sought either
the compulsion of B&W to produce the requested documents, or
an in camera inspection by the court to assess the applicability
of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege,
plaintiff having already provided a prima facie showing that
ongoing fraud exists.432
On February 6, 1995, circuit court Judge William J. Lan-
drum granted the plaintiffs request for in camera review of doc-
uments and will appoint a special master to determine the
applicability of attorney-client privilege, work product doctrine
and/or the crime-fraud exception to these privilege doctrines, if
he finds that the plaintiff has made a showing sufficient to sup-
port a "good faith belief by a reasonable person that [such a]
review of the documents may reveal evidence to establish the
claim that the crime/fraud exception applies." 433 In furtherance
of this, the court ordered B&W to turn over to the court the ap-
proximately six hundred documents within three days, along
with a list cataloging each document, the reasons asserted for
427. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, supra note 423, at 7-8.
428. Id. at 8.
429. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 417, at 24.
430. Miss. R. EVID. 502(d)(1).
431. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, supra note 423, at 8-9.
432. Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 417, at 25-26.
433. Order Granting Motion to Compel at 3, Butler v. Phillip Morris (Miss.
filed Feb. 6, 1995) (No. 94-5-53) [hereinafter "Order Granting Motion to Compel"].
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its confidentiality, the identification of all persons mentioned in
each, and an affidavit signed by counsel of record in Butler v.
Philip Morris that the documents produced are the same com-
plete set of documents as identified by J. Kendrick Wells on two
prior occasions. 434
To date, no determination has been made as to whether or
not the B&W documents are privileged and thereby are pro-
tected from disclosure. However, disinterested attorneys who
have reviewed most of the Brown & Williamson documents
available through the media have rebutted the assertions of the
attorney-client privilege with respect to this material.435
F. The Current Status of the Tobacco Litigation
In addition to the fraudulent activity uncovered in the
B&W documents, the 1990s witnessed Congressman Marty
Meehan's delivery of a "Prosecution Memorandum" to Attorney
General Janet Reno on December 14, 1994 against Brown &
Williamson, its parent company British American Tobacco
Company and its lawyers.436 The Prosecution Memorandum
outlined criminal allegations including perjury, false advertis-
ing, deception of federal agencies, deception of the public, con-
spiracy and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") Law violations.437 As a result of these inquiries, the
United States Attorney's Office in New York and the Justice De-
partment's criminal division in Washington have been review-
ing industry documents and Congressional testimony and
recently convened a grand jury in New York to examine the
434. Id. at 2-3. See also Affidavit of J. Kendrick Wells, supra note 379; Depo-
sition of J. Kendrick Wells (Sept. 8, 1994).
435. Geoffrey Hazard, Jr., an ethics expert at Yale Law School, claims that
"there is no possible reason for a law firm [of Shook, Hardy & Bacon] to be doing
this except to gain the protection of the [attorney-client] privilege," intending to
shield damaging research results from the public. Claudia B, supra note 324, at
Al. Mathew L. Myers, a partner at a Washington D.C. firm, Asbill, Junkin & My-
ers and counsel to the Coalition on Smoking or Health, affirmed Hazard's state-
ment claiming the "documents 'blow the lid off any argument for attorney-client
privilege." Id.
436. Mark Gottlieb, Tobacco Industry Target of Prosecution Memo Submitted
to Justice Department, TOBACCO ON TRIAL, Nov./Dec. 1994, at 13-14.
437. Id.
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prospect of criminal charges against the tobacco executives. 438
Meanwhile, the Food and Drug Administration and President
Clinton are proposing new regulation of tobacco, including the
classification of nicotine as a drug and banning all cigarette
vending machines, in an attempt to restrict children's access to
tobacco.439
All of this comes against the backdrop of an escalating bar-
rage of pending smoker-liability lawsuits wherein the defend-
ant tobacco companies continue to "wage a war of attrition" in
their fight against disclosure. 440 In the pending case of Dunn v.
R.J. Reynolds Nabisco,4 4 1 the defendant Lorillard refused to re-
spond to the plaintiffs discovery requests until a sweeping pro-
tective order was obtained.442 R.J. Reynolds v. Wendell
Gauthier443 involves a complaint, filed by defendant RJR in
North Carolina, over the discovery attempted by the plaintiff
while the class-certified dispute was brought in Louisiana. 444
Plaintiffs are seeking new litigation strategies by pooling their
efforts in class action suits 4 4 5 and employing innovative causes
438. Philip J. Hilts, U.S. Convenes Grand Jury to Look at Tobacco Industry,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at Al, A15.
439. Id. at A15. See also Steve Weinberg, Hardball Discovery, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1995, at 67.
440. See Castano Appendix A, supra note 48, at 9.
441. No. 18 DO1-9305-CT-06 (D.C. Ind. Jan. 17, 1995) (order granting motion
for protective order).
442. Id.
443. No. 6:94 CV 00464 (D.C. N.C. 1995).
444. Id.
445. See, e.g., Castano v. The American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1044, 1995 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 2005 (E.D. La. Feb. 17, 1995). John P. Coale of Washington D.C.'s
Coale, Allen & Van Susteren, has put together a "well-known and well-financed"
group of lawyers who filed this suit in New Orleans, charging the tobacco compa-
nies with "knowingly addicting people to nicotine." Claudia B, supra note 324, at
Al. The suit, known as Castano after Diane Castano, the widow of a smoker, was
filed on behalf of the estimated fifty million allegedly "nicotine-dependent" smok-
ers in America in order to seek punitive and compensatory damages. Castano at
*15. In February, a United States District Judge in New Orleans certified the
class action against sixteen tobacco companies, recognizing that this will "be a
daunting task with long, difficult days ahead." Id. at *56. The following month, on
March 8, 1995, the tobacco companies appealed the class action certification.
Glenn Collins, Tobacco Sees Way to Block a Big Lawsuit By Consumers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995, at Dl, D4. The United States Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded with instructions. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
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of action, such as state-sought reimbursements for Medicaid
costs expended on smoking related illnesses.446
V. Analysis
In their effort to enforce the discovery rules and further the
pursuit of truth, courts have narrowed the mechanisms avail-
able to corporate defendants seeking to avoid discovery. 447 As a
result, corporate defendants have chosen the privilege doc-
trines, so fundamental to the proper functioning of the adver-
sarial system, as their favored method of discovery avoidance,
because these rules have not yet been sufficiently refined to pre-
vent their use as a roadblock to discovery."48 Indeed, the privi-
lege doctrines are so basic to the effective operation of the
adversarial system that they can never be adequately tailored
to avoid abuse by a corporate defendant sufficiently motivated
to impede discovery.
The tobacco companies have sufficiently utilized the attor-
ney-client privilege and the work product doctrine as tactics to
avoid exposing potentially damaging information to litiga-
tion.449 Despite the release by Lorillard, Liggett and Phillip
Morris of thousands of pages of internal documents related to
the health effects of smoking in Cipollone v. Liggett450 and
Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc.,451 thousands more remain con-
cealed under color of the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine.452 While Brown & Williamson has never been
compelled to disclose any documents in litigation, it is currently
446. Suits are commenced by a number of states, including Florida, Missis-
sippi, Minnesota, Texas, and West Virginia, against tobacco companies in an effort
to recover Medicaid costs spent on smoking-related illnesses. See, e.g., Associated
Indus. of Fla., Inc. v. State of Fla., No. 94-3128 (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed June 30, 1995).
See also Allman v. Philip Morris, 865 F. Supp. 665 (D.C. S.D. Cal. filed Sept. 22,
1994) (where the industry faces a federal racketeering suit in San Diego, under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organization Act, seeking $9 billion in dam-
ages over nicotine).
447. See supra part II.
448. See supra part IV.D-E.
449. See, e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1992); Butler
v. Philip Morris, No. 94-5-53 (Miss. filed Jan. 6, 1995); Maddox v. Williams, No. 94-
0171 (D.D.C. filed June 6, 1994); Cipollone v. Liggett, 683 F. Supp. 1478 (D.N.J.
1988).
450. See supra part IV.D.1.
451. See supra part IV.D.2.
452. See supra part IV.D.1-2.
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asserting these privileges to protect hundreds of documents
sought by the plaintiffs in two pending cases, Williams v. Wy-
att4 5 3 and Butler v. Philip Morris, Inc.4 5 4
While the rules of discovery and the ethical canons seek to
protect confidential communications between a client and his
counsel and counsel's work product from disclosure, the pre-
sumption in favor of finding that the privilege exists is not abso-
lute. 45 5 There is a burden on a party asserting the privileges to
establish that the privilege applies to the communication for
which protection is sought, and why the privilege is required for
each of the communications. 4 56 Yet, even though the tobacco
companies have failed to make this requisite showing in Cipol-
lone, Haines, Wyatt or Butler, their boilerplate assertions that
the privileges apply to a sweeping array of materials have been
routinely accepted by trial and appellate courts throughout the
modern history of tobacco litigation. However, an improperly
asserted claim of privilege results in a waiver of the privilege.457
In Haines, a very general privilege log, which failed to de-
scribe the documents or provide the precise reasons for their
protection, was submitted by the defendants. 458 In both Wyatt
and Butler, B&W failed to even submit such a log, and the court
relied wholly on the existence of an affidavit by then General
Counsel of B&W, J. Kendrick Wells, stating that he personally
recognized each document to be selected under attorney super-
vision relevant to pending litigation, as well as the unproven
existence of a signed confidentiality agreement between Merrill
Williams, a paralegal who was the source of these copied docu-
ments, and B&W's law firm, Wyatt on which to base his deci-
sion that the documents were privileged. 459 A later deposition
confirmed that Wells personally recalled looking at each of the
documents in question individually, but he refused to answer
why any specific document should be protected. 460 It seems ex-
453. See supra part IV.E.2.
454. See supra part IV.E.3.
455. For a general discussion of the exceptions to the privilege doctrines see
supra part III.E.
456. See supra text accompanying note 95.
457. See supra text accompanying notes 159-60.
458. See supra note 296.
459. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
460. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
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traordinary that one man could recall hundreds of documents in
detail, specifically, that they were channeled through lawyers
over decades, yet could not recall why any one was individually
deserving of protection. In terms of the confidentiality agree-
ment allegedly signed at the start of William's employment,
Wyatt cannot find the signed copy, and Williams has not testi-
fied to signing it, although the court has accepted Wells' word of
its existence as fact.461
A. Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege
For the attorney-client privilege to apply, certain technical
requirements must be met: the corporation must be a "client";
the lawyer must be engaged in the relationship for the purpose
of rendering legal advice or service; and the information in dis-
pute must be communicated in confidence for the purpose of ob-
taining legal services. 462 If these requirements are met and the
privilege is found to apply, it must then be determined whether
the client has taken any actions which can be construed as con-
stituting a waiver of the privilege. 463
1. Rendering Legal Advice
Despite the policy that the scope of the attorney-client priv-
ilege should be strictly construed so as not to interfere with le-
gitimate discovery efforts, the courts' broad interpretation of
Upjohn464 has encouraged corporations to engage attorneys in
every facet of corporate communication that could possibly be
classified as legal, and in many that clearly cannot, in an effort
to comply with the "legal advice" requirement of the attorney-
client privilege. The tobacco companies have been no
exception. 465
There is abundant evidence establishing the use of tobacco
industry lawyers in the hiring and firing of employees and in
the selection of research projects for industry scientists to pur-
461. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
462. See supra text accompanying note 95.
463. See supra part III.D.
464. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). See, e.g., Sexton, supra
note 126.
465. See supra part III.C.
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sue.46 6 The CTR, which was supposed to be a research group
affiliated with and financed by the tobacco industry, was thick
with lawyers making decisions on every facet of their operations
and handling every document and communication in an at-
tempt to immunize them from later discovery or disclosure.467
As one Brown & Williamson attorney explained "if it goes
wrong, [the findings of the CTR] can be the smoking pistol in a
lawsuit," because all CTR data was considered to have become
privileged merely by its having been channeled through a
lawyer.468
Research was channeled into the Special Project Division of
the CTR after undergoing a sterilization step of handling by in-
dustry attorneys so that the damaging results could be kept
from the public under the color of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 4 6 9 J. Kendrick Wells, as General Counsel, advised Brown
& Williamson on how to immunize their research from public
disclosure: "'In order to be covered by the rules of civil proce-
dure [scientific reports] must be prepared in anticipation of liti-
gation[,]" so Brown & Williamson must "establish 'appropriate
paperwork' with its British parent [BAT] so that documents 'of
a certain nature are prepared for [Brown & Williamson] in an-
ticipation of litigation[;]"' 470 a 1979 memorandum written by
Wells encouraged the company to route all research projects
through the company's legal department;4 71 in a 1984 memo-
randum, Wells stated that "'[d]irect lawyer involvement is
needed in all [British American Tobacco] activities pertaining to
smoking and health, from conception through every step of the
activity[;]'" 472 in a 1986 memorandum, Wells encourages the
utilization of "concise reports . . . [since] the brevity of the re-
ports will reduce the potential for receipt by [Brown & William-
son] of information useful to a plaintiff."473
466. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
467. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
468. See supra note 241.
469. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
470. See supra note 329.
471. See supra note 329.
472. See supra note 328.
473. See supra note 329.
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Memoranda further show that counsel was present at all
company meetings related to scientific research.474 In-house
and outside counsel were directly involved as decisionmakers in
the hiring of scientists and the selection of research projects for
tobacco industry funding.475 Shook & Hardy,476 outside counsel
to Brown & Williamson, Lorillard and Philip Morris, in memo-
randa to in-house counsel at Brown & Williamson dated be-
tween February 1978 and April 1984, revealed the attorneys'
involvement in the hiring of scientists specifically to work on
special research projects. 477 Lawyers became the de facto deci-
sionmakers in funding scientific research, exemplified in a se-
ries of letters from scientists to industry lawyers seeking
approval of research grants. One scientist, requesting a grant
of $88,773 to complete her work on the environmental factors
causing death, received approval from the lawyers at Shook &
Hardy two months later.4 78 A former RJR scientist and key
player in the Special Project Division described the nature of
his position as "wearing two hats," one as a person in charge of
research and development information and the other as an-
swerable to the legal department. 79
After reviewing the "special project documents" in Haines,
the special master observed that the CTR retained its own legal
department and he therefore thought there was sufficient attor-
ney-client communication to find that the privilege existed. 480
However, the mere funneling of information, specifically dam-
aging scientific research, through attorneys clearly constitutes
insufficient attorney input to establish attorney-client privilege
474. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
475. See supra note 329.
476. Shook, Hardy & Bacon, a two-hundred lawyer firm in Kansas City, has
become "synonymous with tobacco for more than three decades" representing
Philip Morris, Brown and Williamson Tobacco Corporation, Lorillard Inc., and ad-
vising the Council for Tobacco Research. John Schwartz & Saundra Torry, In
Practice of Corporate Defense, Kansas City Firm Has Privileged Position, WASH.
POST, Sept. 26, 1995, at A8. In addition, the firm's clients have included the
gunmaker Colt Industries, A.H. Robins Co., and leading drug companies whose
products range from the Dalkon Shield, the anti-miscarriage drug DES, and the
sleep drug Halcion. Id.
477. See supra note 329.
478. See supra note 329.
479. See supra note 329.
480. See supra note 300.
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with respect to the work.481 The purpose of the lawyers' involve-
ment must be the rendering of legal services, not business ad-
vice in order to activate the privilege. 482 Testimony of an in-
house attorney at B&W acknowledged that Wyatt, B&W's se-
nior law firm, had done business counseling for B&W as well as
litigation work. 48 3
In order for the privilege to attach, the advice must be
predominantly legal. 4 8 4 Memoranda between scientists and
lawyers regarding the approval or disapproval of scientific re-
search grants reveals that lawyers took an active administra-
tive role in allocating research funds, based on the degree of
public relations value potential in the project. Additionally, one
letter from Shook & Hardy reveals the firm's involvement in re-
viewing research results before allowing them to be pub-
lished. 485 As a result, scientists and their projects became
primarily accountable to lawyers. These types of communica-
tions are clearly nonprivileged business records, and the mere
handling of the documents by lawyers cannot elevate them to
the status of attorney work product or protect them under attor-
ney-client privilege.486 Where the lawyer's involvement in the
attorney-client relationship takes on the form of business ad-
vice, the rationale behind the attorney-client privilege ceases to
function, and the privilege cannot apply.
2. Confidential Conveyance
The information for which protection is sought must be con-
veyed from the client to the attorney, in confidence, for the pur-
pose of obtaining legal advice or services.487 Although the
"H&K documents," 488 the "special project documents"48 9 and the
"[Brown & Williamson] documents"490 are all allegedly confiden-
tial, confidential communications are limited to the tobacco
481. See supra text accompanying note 115.
482. See supra part III.C.2.
483. See supra note 379.
484. See supra part III.C.2.
485. See supra note 329.
486. See supra text accompanying note 115.
487. See supra text accompanying note 95.
488. See supra text accompanying note 236.
489. See supra text accompanying note 289.
490. See supra part IV.E.1.
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company or employee thereof as the client, not to third parties
such as independently employed scientists. 49 ' Furthermore,
memoranda regarding a CTR meeting where American Tobacco
asserts the need for the CTR to become more politically ori-
ented, hire more "skeptical scientists" and increase its role as
an "industry shield" are clearly not within the scope of an attor-
ney-client communication for purposes of the privilege, and
therefore fall outside the scope of the attorney-client
privilege. 492
Certainly, information analyzed by a paralegal employed
by Wyatt for the purpose of rendering legal advice on pending
tobacco products liability litigation (information which was con-
fidentially conveyed) is entitled to protection under the privi-
lege. However, the special project documents which were
channeled into the Special Project Division of the CTR by indus-
try attorneys to intentionally hide damaging results from the
public and memoranda between scientists and industry lawyers
regarding business decisions on funding research and hiring
should not be subject to the attorney-client privilege.
B. The Assertion of the Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine affords another type of protec-
tion for materials generated by an attorney in anticipation of
litigation, creating a "zone of privacy"4 9 3 within which an attor-
ney may practice his craft free from the prying eyes of any per-
son, whether party to a dispute or not. 4 94 The doctrine provides
a two-tiered system of work product protection, one designed to
protect "ordinary work product," the other designed to protect
opinion, analysis and the mental impressions of the attorney.495
In order for the work product doctrine to apply to an item it
must be prepared in anticipation of some litigation, that is, the
item must be forged by the attorney in the practice of her craft,
and the item must be prepared by a party, by a party's repre-
sentative, or prepared for the use of that party.496 The tobacco
491. See supra part III.A.2, c.1 for discussion of the scope of the privilege.
492. See supra note 308.
493. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
494. See supra part III.B.
495. See supra text accompanying note 105-06.
496. See supra note 101-03 and accompanying text.
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companies have attempted a shotgun application of the work
product doctrine to all of their research, marketing and public
relations efforts in an attempt to force any potential litigants to
exhaust their resources in any attempt to force a tobacco com-
pany to defend itself in any litigation.
1. The Brown and Williamson Documents
The Brown & Williamson documents were among a huge
mass of correspondence generated by, between and amongst the
tobacco companies, their subsidiaries, and their affiliated orga-
nizations. 497 These documents would normally be discoverable
as historical archives; typically, such documents kept in the or-
dinary course of business are considered to be discoverable. 4 9 8
The mere collation, organization and archiving of documents
will not protect them as attorney work product.499 An attorney
is not able to elevate the status of business records to docu-
ments protected by the work product doctrine by the strategy of
"laying on of hands," that is, funneling a document through the
hands of an attorney solely for purposes of granting them privi-
leged status.
J. Kendrick Wells, one time General Counsel for Brown &
Williamson, outlines just such a "laying on of hands" strategy in
a memorandum to another Brown & Williamson attorney: "[I]n
order to be covered by the [work product doctrine] [scientific re-
ports] must be prepared in anticipation of litigation."500 Wells
further advised Brown & Williamson to characterize otherwise
routine paperwork as such, as well as keeping all reports as
brief as possible to reduce the potential of transferring presum-
ably damaging information to an opponent in any potential liti-
gation.501 This memorandum, when considered in light of the
foregoing advice, gives rise to the clear presumption that Brown
& Williamson counsel sought to protect generally nonprivileged
information by cloaking every piece of internal communication,
every research and development study, every business record
and every piece of information pointing to the devastating ef-
497. See supra part IV.E.1.
498. See supra part IV.E.1.
499. See supra text accompanying note 115.
500. See supra note 329.
501. See supra note 329.
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fects of tobacco use on human health within the ambit of the
work product doctrine by having an attorney "bless" each docu-
ment sometime in its life cycle, thereby claiming that the docu-
ment was prepared in anticipation of litigation.
Wells himself, in sworn testimony, seemingly implies that
this whole scheme is fraudulent: he intimates that many of the
documents sought to be protected under the privilege existed
prior to any pending litigation, indeed, they existed prior to any
threats of litigation. 50 2 Although litigation need not be immi-
nent for a document to be prepared "in anticipation of litiga-
tion," there must at least be some highly probable threat of
litigation of which the lawyer is aware, rather than strictly sci-
entific or non-directed legal research. Clearly, by Wells' own
admission, at least some of these documents could not have
been "prepared in anticipation of litigation" as is required to ac-
tivate protection.
Finally, the mere fact that a document is prepared under
the supervision of an attorney does not raise it to the level of
opinion work product.503 Although the courts have recognized
the application of the work product doctrine to non-lawyers
such as Williams working for and under the direct supervision
of any attorney,5 0 4 the document at issue must actually contain
the opinions, conclusions, analysis or mental processes of a law-
yer or quasi-lawyer, generated by or for the use of counsel, not
merely the work product of some non-legal clerk or contractor,
prepared for reason other than for use by the lawyer in the
practice of her craft.5 0 5
The quest for truth and the "right to every man's evidence"
are among the paramount goals of the American judicial sys-
tem.5 0 6 As all privileges must be narrowly construed when con-
sidered in light of the stated purpose of the privilege, the work
product doctrine must not be applied in such broad strokes pri-
marily for the purpose of concealing the truth.
502. See supra notes 379-80.
503. See supra part III.B.
504. See supra note 103.
505. See supra notes 102-04.
506. See supra text accompanying note 173.
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C. Application of the Exceptions to the Privileges
Assuming arguendo that some of the "special project docu-
ments" withheld by the industry in Cipollone and Haines, as
well as the Brown and Williamson documents withheld in Wyatt
and Butler, are privileged and can be established as such, the
burden of showing that an exception to the work product doc-
trine exists falls upon the party seeking discovery - the plaintiff
in all of the aforementioned cases.507 Work product protection
can be overcome by a showing of substantial need for the other-
wise privileged information or undue hardship with respect to
obtaining the information in some other manner or from some
other source.508 The work product doctrine may also be over-
come by a showing that the crime-fraud exception to the privi-
lege applies.509
1. Availability of the Information by Other Sources
In the tobacco litigation, the evidence of all of the plaintiffs'
claims are contained in documents generated by, and in the sole
control of, the defendant tobacco companies.510 There is no other
forum to which the plaintiffs can turn in order to obtain the evi-
dence necessary to prove their claims. Even the materials in
the published press are worthless to these plaintiffs, since they
are inadmissible as hearsay. The plaintiffs in Butler have
presented this very argument as proof of a substantial need for
the "privileged" materials, as well as the "undue hardship" nec-
essary to justify the discoverability of ordinary work product.
2. The Confidentiality of the Communications
Themselves
The confidentiality of the client's communication is the cen-
tral focus of the work product doctrine.511 In order to be covered
under the ordinary work product doctrine, the client's commu-
nications with her attorney must be made in confidence, with
an expectation that the communication will remain confiden-
507. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
508. See supra text accompanying note 112.
509. See supra part III.E.3.
510. See supra part IV.
511. See supra text accompanying note 153.
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tial.512 This principle of confidentiality is so central to the appli-
cation of the privilege that courts have held that disclosure
outside of the attorney-client relationship, regardless of the
purpose, nature or mechanism of that disclosure, will act to
moot the issue of confidence, thereby dissolving the privilege.513
Moreover, disclosure of any material portions of a confidential
communication will waive the privilege with respect to the en-
tire communication. 5 1 4 Similarly, the disclosure of the contents
of the communications to nonlegal and nonquasi-legal person-
nel, whether intentionally or not, will act to waive the
privilege.515
The contents of the Brown & Williamson documents have
been widely distributed outside of the scope of any relationship
necessary to maintain ordinary work product immunity. The
fact that at least some of the documents have been made public
as a result of theft should not matter in considering the issue of
waiver.516
3. The Corporate Context
Courts have narrowed the application of the privilege in the
corporate context to employees directly involved in the privi-
leged communication, or those who handle privileged data on a
strictly "need to know" basis.5 17 Wells testified in Wyatt and
Butler that he had personal knowledge that the B&W docu-
ments were privileged and had never been produced outside of
B&W.5 18 The plaintiff in Butler contends that the disclosure of
four of the allegedly privileged documents, part of a larger col-
lection of documents, constitutes adequate disclosure to waive
the privilege with respect to the rest of the set.5 1 9
Many nonlegal third parties were privy to these allegedly
privileged documents who cannot satisfy the "need to know" cri-
terion required to preserve the applicability of the privilege to
the communication. Research and development employees,
512. See supra part III.B.
513. See supra notes 165-69.
514. See supra note 157.
515. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
516. See supra text accompanying notes 153-57.
517. See supra text accompanying note 170.
518. See supra note 384.
519. See supra text accompanying note 429.
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scientists, those employed by either the tobacco companies or
independent contractors, the CTR, as well as employees of the
public relations firm Hill & Knowlton were all privy to much of
the allegedly privileged data.520 Wigmore has defined the level
to which this disclosure must rise to constitute a waiver of the
privilege: Any disclosure to a third party which increases the
likelihood "'that an adversary will obtain the privileged infor-
mation"' will act to waive the privilege.5 21 Certainly, it
stretches credulity to believe that all of these organizations and
the people employed by them satisfy the narrow "need to know"
basis requirement. Thus, the widespread use of these docu-
ments by the tobacco companies in the context of their relation-
ship with all of these parties surely constitutes disclosure
sufficient to waive the privilege.
4. How Inviolate is the Privilege?
Courts have long held that the privilege is not absolute, but
only broad enough to achieve the purpose of confidentiality
within the context of the rendering of legal advice. 522 Once the
presumption of privilege is established, it may be overcome by a
showing that there is some factual basis on which to support a
reasonable belief that a strong public interest justifies the dis-
closure: an "intermediate" level of proof.5 23
The canons of ethics and the rules of evidence prohibit the
destruction or alteration of evidence and discourage the giving
of false evidence. The discovery rules oblige an attorney to con-
tinually supplement responses to discovery requests as addi-
tional pertinent knowledge becomes available in order to
prevent the knowing concealment of such data.524 Information
so concealed is no longer privileged, nor usable at trial by the
party effectuating the concealment. 525
There is abundant evidence to give strong support to the
inference that the tobacco companies and their attorneys took
part in the destruction, alteration and falsification of evidence.
520. See supra text accompanying notes 240-44 and part IV.E.1.
521. See supra text accompanying note 168.
522. See supra text accompanying note 172 and generally part III.C.2.
523. See supra text accompanying note 196.
524. See supra text accompanying note 31.
525. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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Given the evidence in both the B&W documents and the special
projects documents, it is apparent that the tobacco industry had
voluminous evidence of the health risks associated with the use
of tobacco products and the addictive nature of the nicotine ad-
ded to their tobacco products, yet the companies and their law-
yers not only deny that they possess this knowledge but seek to
conceal this information through means that are clearly disin-
genuous, if not outrightly fraudulent.5 26
J. Kendrick Wells himself was involved in the formation of
a document retention policy mandating that all documents as-
sociated with any scientific studies be marked as requiring spe-
cial handling, collected for isolation, and evaluated for possible
shipment to some foreign subsidiary of B&W or its parent com-
pany BAT, far from the prying eyes of those seeking to examine
them. 5 2 7 The following actions point directly and unequivocally
to an abuse of the attorney-client relationship and actions suffi-
cient to invoke the crime-fraud exception, both of which are fa-
tal to the doctrine of privilege: the removal of this "deadwood,"
particularly the Janus studieS 528 to determine the carcinogenic
nature of cigarette use; the termination of scientific projects
that generated results damaging to the industry's public posi-
tion; the disappearance of research results. Although it must be
acknowledged that the mere knowledge by an attorney of her
client's misconduct is insufficient by itself to force the attorney
to withdraw from the representation or reveal the client's mis-
conduct, an attorney is never permitted to assist the client in
furtherance of such conduct. In the case of the tobacco industry,
however, it appears that industry lawyers were partners, along
with their corporate clients, in this giant cover up.
5. Applicability of the Crime-Fraud Exception
The crime-fraud exception to the work product doctrine and
attorney-client privilege applies when the communication
sought to be protected is made in furtherance of a future or
ongoing crime or fraud.529 A party seeking to overcome the priv-
ilege need only make a prima facie showing of a close relation-
526. See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
527. See supra note 333.
528. See supra note 333.
529. See supra text accompanying note 188.
[Vol. 16:525602
78https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss3/5
PRIVILEGE DOCTRINES
ship between the protected communication and the alleged
fraud.530 No actual proof of a crime or fraud in fact need be
presented, nor must there be a showing that the attorney is
aware of the crime or fraud he is accused of assisting.a31 Courts
have even permitted the use of the allegedly privileged docu-
ments themselves to provide the necessary showing that the ex-
ception should operate. 532
Judge Sarokin, one of the few people to have objectively ex-
amined the Brown & Williamson documents in their entirety,
found not only that the crime-fraud exception should apply to
the documents, but that public policy alone mandates the dis-
closure of these documents.533 Sarokin has further character-
ized the tobacco industry as the "king of concealment and
misinformation"534 and has found, in Haines, enough evidence
to establish a prima facie showing of fraud, stating that they
were deserving of at least an in camera review to determine the
applicability of the crime-fraud exception. 535 Sarokin was par-
ticularly struck by the actions of the industry attorneys who as-
sisted the tobacco companies in their selection of research
projects, and their channeling of the data generated by the
same, in an effort to protect the data under the attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine. 536 Yet, the issue of the ap-
plication of the crime-fraud exception to the special project doc-
uments remains unresolved, despite Sarokin's attempts to do so
in both Cipollone and Haines.537
Identical issues in relation to the Brown and Williamson
documents have yet to be adjudicated in Wyatt and Butler. In
Wyatt, efforts by Merrill Williams to have the documents pub-
lished, having analyzed the documents within the scope of his
employment, has remained equally futile thus far. Subject to a
sweeping "gag order," Williams was unable to assert his own
opinions and observations regarding the employment practices
of the law firm or the contents of the documents even to his own
530. See supra text accompanying note 194.
531. See supra text accompanying note 197.
532. See supra text accompanying note 203.
533. See supra text accompanying notes 312-15.
534. See supra text accompanying note 317.
535. See supra text accompanying notes 311-12.
536. See supra text accompanying note 310.
537. See supra text accompanying notes 278, 307, 313-315.
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attorney. Thus, Williams had neither the opportunity to estab-
lish a showing of fraud sufficient to invoke the crime-fraud ex-
ception nor the ability to seek redress and defend himself
against recent allegations of theft raised against him.538 While
denying William's requests for temporary relief from the injunc-
tion and his requests for an in camera review of the documents
to determine the applicability of the crime-fraud exception, the
trial court held that it was "safe to assume" that the documents
were privileged, relying solely on testimony by Wells and the
alleged existence of the confidentiality agreement.539 Williams
has appealed this determination. 5 4 0
Finally, the court in Butler, as in Haines, found a reason-
able suspicion sufficient to warrant an in camera review, that
the cover of legal advice was used to manipulate information in
furtherance of an industry wide conspiracy to hide the damag-
ing information generated regarding the effects of smoking
upon health.541 Results from such an inspection have yet to be
released. However, disinterested attorneys who have examined
the Brown & Williamson documents assert that the industry is
manipulating the work product doctrine and attorney-client
privilege to serve its own purposes. 542 Hopefully, issues will be
adjudicated fairly once and for all, so that the privilege doc-
trines can once again be employed for their intended use. While
the issue of the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to the
Brown and Williamson documents awaits proper adjudication
somewhere in the judicial system and criminal investigations of
the tobacco industry are ongoing by the Department of Jus-
tice,543 the story told by members of the tobacco industry them-
selves in memoranda, minutes, research studies, the testimony
of the industry lawyers and scientists, and the CTR is clearly
one of concealment, not just from its opponents in litigation but
from the American public.
538. See supra part IV.E.2.
539. See supra text accompanying note 356.
540. See supra text accompanying note 359.
541. See supra text accompanying note 438.
542. See supra note 440 and accompanying text.
543. See supra text accompanying notes 441-44.
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VI. Conclusion
From the very origins of the discovery rules, ethical canons
and the privilege doctrines, the societal interest in preventing
crime and fraud outweigh the confidentiality between an attor-
ney and his client. To find otherwise would violate the basic
premise of our adversarial system to seek the truth. The rules
and privileges are not self-effectuating; therefore, all stone-
walling abuse results from attorneys' failure to employ them
properly and from the courts' failure to proscribe such conduct.
Thus, when such misconduct is not taken to task, there exists
no incentive to comply for any party. Particularly since detec-
tion of stonewalling is often difficult, the onus of deterring such
abuse lies upon the legal profession and the courts. Although
there is a growing trend for increased sanctions, 544 they are
"meaningless unless a violation entails a penalty proportionate
to the gravity of the violation[,J"545 such that the costs of stone-
walling outweigh the benefits, particularly for these corporate
defendants like the tobacco industry.
Christine Hatfield*
544. See supra text accompanying note 76.
545. See supra text accompanying note 78.
* J.D., Pace University School of Law, 1996.
1996] 605
81
